From care ethics to pluralist care theory: The state of the field

Abstract

In a moment where needs for care are acute and their provision precarious, feminist care ethics has gained new relevance as a framework for understanding and responding to necessary interdependence. This article reviews and evaluates two long‐standing critiques of care ethics in light of this recent research. First, I assess what I call the pluralist feminist critique, or the dispute over the ability of care ethics to address the needs and histories of a range of marginalized subjects. I identify two forms of this critique: the first disputes the biased starting points shaping the development of the theory, and the second concerns the weaponization of care in support of domination. Although these critiques are well‐established, I draw attention to recent responses that move care theory in generative directions. I argue that the pluralist feminist critique demands both self‐critical transformation in dialog with other feminist schools of thought and a robust account of care ethics' normative authority. I then take up critiques those levied by mainstream ethicists concerned with care theory's adequacy as an ethical approach. I show that recent work on normative authority, conceptual uniqueness, and the grounding of responsibility must be engaged before care theory can be dismissed as “under‐theorized.” In articulating these two sets of critiques and evaluating recent rebuttals to them, I argue for a pluralist feminist theory of care within which strands informed by varying philosophical schools and methods can coexist.

Care for education

“…Tal vez sea a las madres, no a todas, sino a aquellas que no suelen comparan a sus hijos, a las madres que ven a cada hijo como diferente y necesitado de un cuidado ajustado a su individualidad. Pero en la ética del cuidado, ha habido académicos como Joan Tronto (1987) que se distanciaron de actos específicos de cuidado como lo hacen las madres y los padres, y en su lugar elaboraron las formas de razonamiento formadas por la experiencia de género en una teoría moral y política (Gary, 2021).…”