From Cognitive Agents to Cognitive Systems: Theoretical, Methodological, and Empirical Developments of van Gelder's (1998) “Dynamical Hypothesis”

Abstract

Over two decades have passed since the publication of van Gelder's (1998) “dynamical hypothesis.” In that paper, van Gelder proposed that cognitive agents were not digital computers—per the representational computational approach—but dynamical systems. The evolution of the dynamical hypothesis was driven by parallel advances in three areas. Theoretically, a deeper understanding of genetics, biology, neuroscience, and cognitive science inspired questions about how systems within each domain dynamically interact and extend their effects across spatiotemporal scales. Methodologically, more sophisticated and domain‐general tools allowed researchers to discover, model, and quantify system dynamics, structure, and patterns across multiple scales to generate a more comprehensive system‐level understanding of behaviors. Empirically, we can analyze a system's behavior while preserving its natural dynamics, revealing evidence that the reductionist approach leads to an incomplete understanding of the components and the overall system. Researchers have traditionally reduced a complex system into its component processes and assumed that the parts can be recombined to explain the whole. These three advances fundamentally altered our understanding of a “cognitive agent:” How their behaviors are driven by long‐range coordination across multiple processes, how the interdependent and nested structure of interacting variables produces behaviors that are greater than the sum of its parts, and how environmental constraints shape adaptive yet stable behavioral patterns.