2006
DOI: 10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.009
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From collective intentionality to intentional collectives: An ontological perspective

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Cited by 33 publications
(47 citation statements)
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“…One corresponds to the definition of the intermediate notions of collection and collective, a collective being considered as a special case of collection [13]. As we have seen, we adopt a different position in accepting the concept Collection as defined by these authors, but in founding on different basis the notion of collective, and further of organization.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 98%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…One corresponds to the definition of the intermediate notions of collection and collective, a collective being considered as a special case of collection [13]. As we have seen, we adopt a different position in accepting the concept Collection as defined by these authors, but in founding on different basis the notion of collective, and further of organization.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…On the one hand, in the field of formal ontologies, we have resources such as the foundational ontology DOLCE [12] 1 widely opened to the analysis of social entities. We have also recent works in the fields of formal ontologies of collections and collectives [13,14], formal ontologies of actions [15] and formal ontologies of processes [16]. On the other hand, it emerges from recent work in Philosophy of action, particularly in the Philosophy of collective social action [17,18] and in the Philosophy of the Social Science [19], a conceptual coherent framework to analyze social collective actions.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Since this axiom is a second order one, our OWL-DL axiomatization makes use of an extension of DOLCE called theory of collections (Bottazzi et al 2006), which reifies qualified sets as non-physical endurants that are unified by a description. In this case, the so-called collection of (all) physical endurants is unified by any instance of structural dependence:…”
Section: Dependences Between Quality Changesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bottazzi et al [7] are concerned with "intentional collectives", where "intentional" (with a "t") is not to be confused with "intensional" (with an "s") as used above; nor is "intentional" to be confused with "intention" in the sense of what one intends to do, but is rather related to intentionality in the sense of "aboutness", as described by Searle [27]. In this paper, as distinct from [6] and [11], the term "collection" is used to denote an I-collective; for example, "a collection of books in a library remains the same entity even if some books are lost and others are acquired over time".…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although they do not explicitly consider collectives, similar considerations might be applicable. Consider an I-collective whose members are mandatory but not essential, such as a chess-set: 7 if the black queen goes missing, it must be replaced by the same or another one for the chess set to continue to exist. This is comparable to the dinner service mentioned by Rector et al During the period between the loss of the queen and its subsequent replacement, however, it is not appropriate to say that the chess-set has been destroyed ("disabled"); rather, it is "suspended".…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%