From defection to ingroup favoritism to cooperation: simulation analysis of the social dilemma in dynamic networks

Takesue, Hirofumi

doi:10.1007/s42001-019-00058-4

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 79 publications

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“…Research has suggested that selectively interacting with one's group allows parochial cooperation to emerge [45,[53][54][55][56]. We, however, allow agents to condition cooperation on the partner's signal (or the absence thereof) in a randomly mixed population.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Signals of belonging: emergence of signalling norms as facilitators of trust and parochial cooperation

Macanovic,

Tsvetkova,

Przepiorka

et al. 2024

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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Mechanisms of social control reinforce norms that appear harmful or wasteful, such as mutilation practises or extensive body tattoos. We suggest such norms arise to serve as signals that distinguish between ingroup ‘friends' and outgroup ‘foes', facilitating parochial cooperation. Combining insights from research on signalling and parochial cooperation, we incorporate a trust game with signalling in an agent-based model to study the dynamics of signalling norm emergence in groups with conflicting interests. Our results show that costly signalling norms emerge from random acts of signalling in minority groups that benefit most from parochial cooperation. Majority groups are less likely to develop costly signalling norms. Yet, norms that prescribe sending costless group identity signals can easily emerge in groups of all sizes—albeit, at times, at the expense of minority group members. Further, the dynamics of signalling norm emergence differ across signal costs, relative group sizes, and levels of ingroup assortment. Our findings provide theoretical insights into norm evolution in contexts where groups develop identity markers in response to environmental challenges that put their interests at odds with the interests of other groups. Such contexts arise in zones of ethnic conflict or during contestations of existing power relations. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Social norm change: drivers and consequences’.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Signals of belonging: emergence of signalling norms as facilitators of trust and parochial cooperation

Macanovic,

Tsvetkova,

Przepiorka

et al. 2024

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Signals of Belonging: Emergence of Signalling Norms as Facilitators of Trust and Parochial Cooperation

Macanovic,

Tsvetkova,

Przepiorka

et al. 2023

Preprint

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Mechanisms of social control reinforce norms that appear harmful or wasteful, such as mutilation practices or extensive body tattoos. We suggest such norms arise to serve as signals that distinguish between ingroup “friends” and outgroup “foes”, facilitating parochial cooperation. Combining insights from research on signalling and parochial cooperation, we incorporate a trust game with signalling in an agent-based model to study the dynamics of signalling norm emergence in groups with conflicting interests. Our results show that costly signalling norms emerge from random acts of signalling in minority groups that benefit most from parochial cooperation. Majority groups are less likely to develop costly signalling norms. Yet, norms that prescribe sending costless group identity signals can easily emerge in groups of all sizes – albeit, at times, at the expense of minority group members. Further, the dynamics of signalling norm emergence differ across signal costs, relative group sizes, and levels of ingroup assortment. Our findings provide theoretical insights into norm evolution in contexts where groups develop identity markers in response to environmental challenges that put their interests at odds with the interests of other groups. Such contexts arise in zones of ethnic conflict or during contestations of existing power relations.

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“…This assumption implies that avoiding out-group members does not lead to welfare loss in each interaction. However, empirical and theoretical studies have observed that preference for in-group partners often results in the loss of profitable opportunities with out-groups [70][71][72]. Differences in payoffs can contribute to developing an un-derstanding about the welfare implications of out-group avoidance.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm

Takesue

2017

Journal of Theoretical Biology

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From defection to ingroup favoritism to cooperation: simulation analysis of the social dilemma in dynamic networks

Cited by 6 publications

References 79 publications

Signals of belonging: emergence of signalling norms as facilitators of trust and parochial cooperation

Signals of belonging: emergence of signalling norms as facilitators of trust and parochial cooperation

Signals of Belonging: Emergence of Signalling Norms as Facilitators of Trust and Parochial Cooperation

Partner selection and emergence of the merit-based equity norm

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