From ‘Economic Miracle’ to the ‘Sick Man of the Socialist Camp’

Abstract

The 1970s were a particular decade in Polish history. In December 1970, an economic and political crisis resulting from price increases led to the dismissal of Władysław Gomułka as head of the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) and the appointment of a new leadership. Edward Gierek's takeover of power symbolised a new beginning and hope for constructive reforms in Poland. Nevertheless, ten years later in August 1980, Gierek and his political agenda were also dismissed in a context of economic and political crisis. However, despite some similarities, Poland's situation in the summer of 1980 was very different to that before Christmas in 1970. Strikes were no longer spontaneous worker demonstrations but instead a coordinated cross-country movement supported by powerful dissident organisations. Moreover, this time the protesters demanded not only an improvement in economic and labour conditions but also human rights, such as freedom of speech, which the socialist regimes had committed to respecting in the Final Act of the CSCE, signed in August 1975. The economic situation which underlaid the political upheaval was additionally complicated by $22 billion in debts owed to Western creditors which had accumulated over the previous ten years. Unlike in 1970, the crisis could hardly be explained without considering Western influence or be handled independently of Western actors. The ties between socialist Poland and the capitalist world were the most irreversible outcome of Gierek's decade.Despite the paramount impact which the unprecedented opening up towards the West had on the situation of the Polish socialist regime, it has rarely been studied as an independent phenomenon. 1 Instead, the historiography of the 1970s deals predominantly with the two crises, their origins and consequences. 2 The emphasis on revolts against the regime, however, results in a perception of political decisions, including those concerning economic and foreign policy, being solely responses to pressure from society. The strategy of the Polish socialist elite is therefore usually regarded as a constant balancing of claims by the population on the one hand and commands arriving from the Soviet Union on the other. However, looking at the socialist regimes from a comparative perspective allows the differences between national strategies to be highlighted and therefore the socialist elites to be rediscovered with their convictions, interpretations and goals as agents of the diversified trajectories of the Eastern European states in the 1970s.

10. COVID-19 and the Corporate Digital Divide

“…One of the crucial experiences of this time was the attempt to accelerate the growth of state investment financed by foreign loans in the 1970s. This did not lead to the expected increase in productivity, but rather a huge foreign debt, which also contributed to the collapse of the economy (Komornicka 2020). A both overwhelming and ineffective state, the domination of a "dirty" heavy industry and low-quality public infrastructure of the communist era largely explains the support that Poles gave in the late 1980s to the shock transformation aimed at a rapid shift to a free market.…”