From failure to failure: The politics of international banking regulation

Lall, Ranjit

doi:10.1080/09692290.2011.603669

Cited by 151 publications

(113 citation statements)

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“…In particular, while powerful organized interests within the financial industry are often characterized as securing disproportionate access to high-level policymakers, other stakeholders such as smaller financial institutions, non-financial corporations, and diffuse interests such as deposit holders, small investors and taxpayers are often perceived as excluded from the policymaking process (Lall, 2012;Underhill & Zhang, 2008;Johnson & Kwak, 2010). As a result, several policy proposals designed to improve financial regulation have focused on enhancing the plurality of interest groups involved in the design of regulatory policies in an attempt to add countervailing voices to the dominance of the financial industry and restore balance to the process (Morgan, 2011, p. 595;Baxter, 2011;Pagliari, 2012).…”

Section: Section 1: Interest Group Plurality and Financial Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because financial industry 'insiders' are understood to exploit their informational advantages and their network of personal connections with financial regulators, their early mobilization crowds out other kinds of stakeholders (Lall, 2012). This "first mover advantage" however decreases during later stages of the policymaking process as more information regarding the impact of different regulatory proposals become available to other stakeholders.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…First, most studies of interest groups in financial regulation have focused on specific policies, institutions or actors through in-depth qualitative case studies (Lall, 2012;Quaglia, 2008;Woll, 2013;Mügge, 2006), thus making a general overview of this terrain difficult to ascertain. While this qualitative literature has greatly informed the hypotheses we test, our analysis complements existing scholarship through a quantitative analysis aimed at observing general but context-varying trends in the participation of interest groups in financial regulatory politics (see also Young and Pagliari 2015).…”

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confidence: 99%

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The interest ecology of financial regulation: interest group plurality in the design of financial regulatory policies

Pagliari

Young

2015

Socioecon Rev

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This is the accepted version of the paper.This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link AbstractExisting literature has offered a variety of claims regarding why financial regulatory politics features a relative dominance of the regulated financial industry. In this article we explore the broader interest group environment in which financial industry advocacy operates. Using new data on interest group participation in financial regulatory consultations, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of the ecology of interest groups that populate financial regulatory policymaking. Through a new measure of 'mobilized dissent' we find evidence that the level of interest group pluralism in financial regulatory policymaking is constrained by the limited mobilization of voices outside of the business community. We analyze how mobilized dissent toward the regulated financial industry changes in response to different institutional environments. While technical complexity, institutional context, and the global financial crisis are found to impact the level of mobilized dissent, the impact of these environmental conditions varies across different groups. This analysis reveals not only that organized opposition to the financial industry is relatively weak but also that it is relatively disjointed.

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Section: Section 1: Interest Group Plurality and Financial Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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The interest ecology of financial regulation: interest group plurality in the design of financial regulatory policies

Pagliari

Young

2015

Socioecon Rev

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“…Recent work on the role of professional environments and experts in global governance has focused on areas such as accountancy governance (Botzem, 2008;, banking regulation (Lall, 2012;Young, 2012), financial reform (Baker, 2010;Seabrooke & Tsingou, 2014) and transnational lawmaking (Trubek et al 1994;Quack, 2007). This paper builds on these works but also complements them in important ways, empirically and theoretically.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Professional Competition in Global Tax Reform: Transparency in Global Wealth Chains

Christensen¹

2017

Preprint

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Abstract:In the wake of the Great Recession, international corporate taxation has risen to the top of the global political agenda. With states seeking to shore up national fiscal systems, the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project has emerged as the key response in this regard. Among 15 action points, Action 13 on corporate tax transparency has been particularly prominent. By shaping the feasibility of corporate tax strategies and the information resources available to national tax authorities, the Action 13 policy recommendations will fundamentally reconfigure the context of corporate tax behaviour and global wealth chains, i.e. strategies and structures for wealth creation and protection in the global economy. How did these new critical rules come about? Unfortunately, little is known about the micro-level process, dynamics and actors of the BEPS project. This paper provides an original case study of the changing international tax system and the regulatory context of global wealth chains, based on an investigation of the professionals engaged in global tax reform. Drawing on observations, interviews and sequence analysis of professional careers, it studies the dynamics of the professional policy environment and identifies distinct career and knowledge trends. The paper shows that professional competition for prestige and knowledge played a central role in the complex, transnational policy process. Operating within a technical policy environment, far removed from high-level politics, professionals seeking to make their mark on new standards for corporate tax transparency mobilised expertise and network capital, shaping what could be discussed, the criteria for accepted arguments, and who was listened to in the policy process, thus critically affecting the final policy outcomes.

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“…Proposals to separate investment banking from commercial and retail banking such as the Volcker rule in the US, or ring-fencing in the UK (UK Independent Commission on Banking, 2011) also imply a return to traditional banking. However, to date, reforms have been watered down through compromises with market-based views of banking (Lall, 2012) and appear unable to reverse the trend toward market-based banking in large private banks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alternative Banking and Theory

Butzbach

Mettenheim

2014

Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium

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Unlike business models of private banks based on profit maximization and shareholder-oriented governance, alternative banks (such as cooperative banks, government savings banks, and special purpose banks) share business models based on sustainable returns with longer time horizons, corporate missions that include social and public policy goals, and stakeholder-oriented governance. Strong evidence from recent research suggests that alternative banks often equal or outperform joint-stock banks in terms of efficiency, profitability, and risk management. This counters core ideas in contemporary banking theory and expectations of regulators about the superiority of private ownership and market-based banking. Concepts and theories from banking studies help explain how alternative banks outperform private banks in core functions such as creating and managing liquidity, pooling deposits, and reducing information asymmetries and agency costs. However, heterodox theories of the firm and institutional approaches to competitive advantage broaden the scope of analysis to explain further historical, social, and organizational advantages (and risks) in alternative banking. Alternative banks therefore require, and may inspire, alternative theories of banking and new approaches to bank regulation.

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From failure to failure: The politics of international banking regulation

Cited by 151 publications

References 12 publications

The interest ecology of financial regulation: interest group plurality in the design of financial regulatory policies

The interest ecology of financial regulation: interest group plurality in the design of financial regulatory policies

Professional Competition in Global Tax Reform: Transparency in Global Wealth Chains

Alternative Banking and Theory

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