From Farfalle to Megafono via Ciminion: The PRF Hydra for MPC Applications

Grassi, Lorenzo; Øygarden, Morten; Schofnegger, Markus; Walch, Roman

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-30634-1_9

Cited by 9 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 42 publications

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“…However, this comes at a cost: a very simple algebraic representation. Examples of recently proposed AO ciphers and hash functions are LowMC Hydra [GØSW23] and Arion [RST23]. Unfortunately, with AO an often-neglected threat reemerged in cryptography: Gröbner bases.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Solving Degree Bounds for Iterated Polynomial Systems

Steiner

2024

ToSC

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For Arithmetization-Oriented ciphers and hash functions Gröbner basis attacks are generally considered as the most competitive attack vector. Unfortunately, the complexity of Gröbner basis algorithms is only understood for special cases, and it is needless to say that these cases do not apply to most cryptographic polynomial systems. Therefore, cryptographers have to resort to experiments, extrapolations and hypotheses to assess the security of their designs. One established measure to quantify the complexity of linear algebra-based Gröbner basis algorithms is the so-called solving degree. Caminata & Gorla revealed that under a certain genericity condition on a polynomial system the solving degree is always upper bounded by the Castelnuovo-Mumford regularity and henceforth by the Macaulay bound, which only takes the degrees and number of variables of the input polynomials into account. In this paper we extend their framework to iterated polynomial systems, the standard polynomial model for symmetric ciphers and hash functions. In particular, we prove solving degree bounds for various attacks on MiMC, Feistel-MiMC, Feistel-MiMC-Hash, Hades and GMiMC. Our bounds fall in line with the hypothesized complexity of Gröbner basis attacks on these designs, and to the best of our knowledge this is the first time that a mathematical proof for these complexities is provided. Moreover, by studying polynomials with degree falls we can prove lower bounds on the Castelnuovo-Mumford regularity for attacks on MiMC, Feistel-MiMC and Feistel-MiMCHash provided that only a few solutions of the corresponding iterated polynomial system originate from the base field. Hence, regularity-based solving degree estimations can never surpass a certain threshold, a desirable property for cryptographic polynomial systems.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%