From intrapsychic to ecological theories in social psychology: Outlines of a functional theory approach

Abstract

Social psychology is facing a major developmental task, which is not primarily one of achieving larger data samples and stricter significance testing. What is needed, rather, is an improvement in logic of science and powerful theorizing. The starting point of this article is a critical appraisal that the intrapsychic concepts (motives, attitudes, and explicit and implicit goals) that are the major focus of social-psychological theories lack in explanatory power because they are too close to the effects (actions, judgments, and decisions) they are intended to explain. To overcome this apparent weakness (compared with neuroscience or genetics), it is proposed that more powerful theories should relate social cognition and behavior to more distant variables in the environment. A functional analysis reveals that intrapsychic processes are multiply predetermined by extrapsychic, environmental constraints. The theoretical value and fertility of the proposed ecological functionalism are illustrated with reference to three areas of empirical research: sampling approaches to understanding biases in judgment and decision making; strategic influences on priming effects within a functional analysis of adaptive behavior; and the impact of verbal and symbolic communication constraints on the construction of attributions, stereotypes, and culture.

The functional‐cognitive framework for psychological research: Controversies and resolutions

“…Thus, activity at the functional level provides the raw fuel (behavioural effects) needed to drive the engines of mental theorising. In this way, a strong functional approach is a basic requirement for a strong cognitive approach (for similar arguments see Fiedler, ). At the same time, the framework also highlighted that theories at the mental level can systematically organise functional knowledge (i.e., heuristic value) and generate new hypotheses about the conditions under which those effects occur (i.e., predictive value).…”

“…Finally, Fiedler (this issue) engages in a comparative evaluation of the functional and cognitive levels of analysis. He argues that cognitive psychology is deeply anchored in functional (effect centric) research and that progress within psychological science has often been driven by accumulating knowledge of functional (environment‐behaviour) relations rather than “stellar moments” of mental process research.…”

“…For well over 40 years now the mental mechanistic approach has influenced the scientific values, goals and assumptions of many, if not most in psychological science. Although it has undoubtedly accelerated our understanding of the human mind (for reviews, see Eysenck & Keane, ; Miller, ; but see Fiedler, , this issue), it is important to realise that it is not the only way of studying psychological phenomena. Indeed, elsewhere in the archipelago one would find a number of tribes that are also studying the origins and properties of human behaviour, language and cognition.…”

Agential Realism als Basis queer(end)er Experimentalpsychologie

“…Dies hält er vor allem deshalb für erstrebenswert, weil er davon ausgeht, dass Objektivität und jene Distanz zentrale Bestandteile von wissenschaftlichem Fortschritt seien: "In other words, theoretical distance and objectivity are not just useful for the public image; they are key properties of scientific growth." (Fiedler, 2014 Hegarty & Bruckmüller, 2013).…”

Functional research and cognitive‐process research in behavioural science: An unequal but firmly connected pair

“…However, this polemic style should not prevent one from reflecting on the distinction between functional and cognitive psychology (cf. De Houwer, ; De Houwer, Barnes‐Holmes, & Moors, ; Fiedler, ).…”