From irresponsible knaves to responsible knights for just 5p: behavioural public policy and the environment

Disney, Kate; Atkinson, Giles

doi:10.1017/cbo9781107337190.004

Cited by 19 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…(Carattini et al, 2019) How to discourage single-use plastic bags? (Disney et al, 2013) Tax or rebate? Hypothecation of taxes to increase public support?…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The i-frame and the s-frame: How focusing on individual-level solutions has led behavioral public policy astray

Chater¹,

Loewenstein²

2022

Behav Brain Sci

263

140

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An influential line of thinking in behavioral science, to which the two authors have long subscribed, is that many of society's most pressing problems can be addressed cheaply and effectively at the level of the individual, without modifying the system in which the individual operates. We now believe this was a mistake, along with, we suspect, many colleagues in both the academic and policy communities. Results from such interventions have been disappointingly modest. But more importantly, they have guided many (though by no means all) behavioral scientists to frame policy problems in individual, not systemic, terms: to adopt what we call the “i-frame,” rather than the “s-frame.” The difference may be more consequential than i-frame advocates have realized, by deflecting attention and support away from s-frame policies. Indeed, highlighting the i-frame is a long-established objective of corporate opponents of concerted systemic action such as regulation and taxation. We illustrate our argument briefly for six policy problems, and in depth with the examples of climate change, obesity, retirement savings, and pollution from plastic waste. We argue that the most important way in which behavioral scientists can contributed to public policy is by employing their skills to develop and implement value-creating system-level change.

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“…(Carattini et al, 2019) How to discourage single-use plastic bags? (Disney et al, 2013) Tax or rebate? Hypothecation of taxes to increase public support?…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The i-frame and the s-frame: How focusing on individual-level solutions has led behavioral public policy astray

Chater¹,

Loewenstein²

2022

Behav Brain Sci

263

140

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Small incentives can highlight the pro-social nature of the act being promulgated, encouraging citizens to carry out what they would ideally like to do. For example, charging for plastic bags in supermarkets can help people realise their aim of becoming environmental citizens (Disney et al 2013).…”

Section: Incentives and Pro-social Behavioursmentioning

confidence: 99%

Targeting voter registration with incentives: A randomized controlled trial of a lottery in a London borough

John

MacDonald²,

Sanders

2015

Electoral Studies

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Does an incentive-in the form of a lottery-increase voter registration, particularly among poorer members of society? In the summer of 2012, two groups of 20,000 randomly selected households from a London Borough were informed that they would be placed into a prize draw if they registered to vote by 28 September 2012. One group was offered £5,000 and the other £1,000while the remaining households in the borough received the standard letter with the same deadline but no lottery offer. The registration rates after the deadline were 46.2 per cent in the £1,000 group and 46.6 per cent in the £1,000 group compared to 44.7 in the control. Levels of registration in the two treatment groups are statistically different to the control, but not from each other.Households in poorer locations are more receptive of the lottery offer whereas there is no effect in places where richer households live. After the face-to-face canvass of all remaining non-registered households, which took place after the experiment, there were no statistically significant differences between the treatment groups and the control. The study builds on the work of Raja and Schaffner (2012) and Panagopoulos (2013) by finding that incentives work in different ways depending on their level and who is targeted.

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“…Both co-exist in policy and practice and one may have (adverse) consequences upon the other (Taylor-Gooby et al , 2000). Disney et al (2013) refer to self-determination theory to explain this inter-relationship (Deci and Ryan, 2000). Policies which maintain the possibility of autonomy are internalized (thus enabling crowding-in) and, because they are perceived as fair, will enhance intrinsic motivation through extrinsic means.…”

Section: Knights Knaves and Doctorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Whilst traits of both knightly and knavish behaviour were visibly apparent (Disney et al, 2013), many of their arguments relied on an inter-dependence between them (Frey, 1997;Frey, 2013;Klein, 2012;Le Grand, 2003). Thus, extrinsic rewards were required, they argued, to secure their intrinsic motivation.…”

Section: Doctors As Knights and Knaves: A Re-assessmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knights and Knaves in the English Medical Profession: the Case of Clinical Excellence Awards

2015

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We elaborate Le Grand's thesis of ‘knights and knaves’ in terms of clinical excellence awards (CEAs), the ‘financial bonuses’ which are paid to over half of all English hospital specialists and which can be as much as £75,000 (€92,000) per year in addition to an NHS (National Health Service) salary. Knights are ‘individuals who are motivated to help others for no private reward’ while knaves are ‘self-interested individuals who are motivated to help others only if by doing so they will serve their private interests.’ Doctors (individually and collectively) exhibit both traits but the work of explanation of the inter-relationship between them has remained neglected. Through a textual analysis of written responses to a recent review of CEAs, we examine the ‘knightly’ and ‘knavish’ arguments used by medical professional stakeholders in defending these CEAs. While doctors promote their knightly claims, they are also knavish in shaping the preferences of, and options for, policy-makers. Policy-makers continue to support CEAs but have introduced revised criteria for CEAs, putting pressure on the medical profession to accept reforms. CEAs illustrate the enduring and flexible power of the medical profession in the UK in colonising reforms to their pay, and also the subtle inter-relationship between knights and knaves in health policy.

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From irresponsible knaves to responsible knights for just 5p: behavioural public policy and the environment

Cited by 19 publications

References 13 publications

The i-frame and the s-frame: How focusing on individual-level solutions has led behavioral public policy astray

The i-frame and the s-frame: How focusing on individual-level solutions has led behavioral public policy astray

Targeting voter registration with incentives: A randomized controlled trial of a lottery in a London borough

Knights and Knaves in the English Medical Profession: the Case of Clinical Excellence Awards

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