2017
DOI: 10.1017/s1537592716004126
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From Medicine to Mobilization: Social Service Provision and the Islamist Reputational Advantage

Abstract: Under what conditions can parties use social-service provision to generate political support? And what is the causal mechanism connecting social-service provision to citizen mobilization? I argue that service provision conveys to voters a politically valuable image of the provider organization’s competence and probity, which is particularly valuable when information about parties and platforms is contradictory or poor. Support comes from an in-depth investigation into the medical networks of the Egyptian Musli… Show more

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Cited by 36 publications
(9 citation statements)
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References 62 publications
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“…The first such argument is that Islamist parties benefit from mobilizational advantages conferred upon them by networks of mosques and other religious institutions (Blaydes ; Kandil ; Masoud ; Wickham ; Wiktorowicz ). A second set of arguments locates the Islamist electoral advantage in their provision of social services (Bayat ; Brooke ; Cammett and Issar ; Clark ; Ismail ; Wedeen ). A third set of arguments contends that Islamist parties earn votes because their religious characteristics serve as a signal of other, nonreligious attributes, such as incorruptibility, purity, a commitment to social justice, honesty (Brown ; Cammett and Luong ; Wickham ), or their economic policy positions (Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani ).…”
contrasting
confidence: 76%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The first such argument is that Islamist parties benefit from mobilizational advantages conferred upon them by networks of mosques and other religious institutions (Blaydes ; Kandil ; Masoud ; Wickham ; Wiktorowicz ). A second set of arguments locates the Islamist electoral advantage in their provision of social services (Bayat ; Brooke ; Cammett and Issar ; Clark ; Ismail ; Wedeen ). A third set of arguments contends that Islamist parties earn votes because their religious characteristics serve as a signal of other, nonreligious attributes, such as incorruptibility, purity, a commitment to social justice, honesty (Brown ; Cammett and Luong ; Wickham ), or their economic policy positions (Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani ).…”
contrasting
confidence: 76%
“…Bayat (), Cammett and Issar (), Clark (), Ismail (), Wickham (), and Wicktorowicz (2004) all argue that Islamist parties have been able to convert this reliance on their social services into votes at the ballot box in a traditional clientelistic manner. Alternatively, these services may give Islamist parties credibility (Masoud ) or signal their competence and approachability (Brooke ).…”
Section: Strain Religion and Political Islammentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To what extent was the Muslim Brotherhood inspired by such movements, and what factors explain the Brotherhood’s relative success and resilience? As scholars become more concerned with uncovering the precise ways in which Islamist groups are advantaged over their non-Islamist competitors, such a comparison would seem to hold great promise (Brooke 2017; Cammett and Jones Luong 2014; Masoud 2014; Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani 2012).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This finding tallies with other studies of Islamist mobilization, which portray organized political Islam as a religious social movement that provides functions and services that might otherwise be fulfilled by the state. However, as Melani Cammett and Pauline Jones Luong (2014) note, this dynamic is frequently cited, but rarely if ever empirically demonstrated (Brooke 2017 is an exception). In this, our article provides concrete evidence that organized political Islam emerged in areas where the state lacked capacity, an important precondition for welfare-centric arguments about Islamists’ appeal and mobilization.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Furthermore, the Brotherhood benefited greatly from the imposition of World Bank and IMF conditions on Egypt since the late 1980s. Not only did the movement use these conditions and their social costs to discredit the Mubarak regime and emphasize the regime's inability to create jobs and provide basic social needs particularly to the poor, it also capitalized on them to expand its social service provision activities (Clark 2004;Brooke 2017). The Brotherhood criticized corruption and lack of social justice under the Mubarak regime.…”
Section: The Muslim Brotherhood's Socio-economic Visionmentioning
confidence: 99%