Purpose
State-owned firms play important roles in Chinese cross-border acquisition (CBA) activities. However, compared with private firms, state-owned firms have a lower likelihood of acquisition completion and take longer to complete a deal. This paper aims to determine why this phenomenon exists and how state-owned firms can overcome the constraints of their identity.
Design/methodology/approach
By integrating organizational learning theory with institutional theory, this paper attempts to answer the research questions from a legitimacy perspective. Employing Chinese CBA data from 1982 to 2014, the authors use a logit model and a random effects model to test the hypothesis.
Findings
The results show that a state-owned identity easily causes legitimacy concerns among host country regulatory agencies; thus, it may result in longer and more uncertain evaluation behaviors, which lead to a lower likelihood of CBA completion and a longer deal duration. Only experience with failed acquisitions can increase CBA completion probability. Furthermore, in very complex decision-making environments, such as that surrounding deal duration, only specific types of experience (i.e. experience of failed international acquisitions) can trigger learning behavior, whereas general experience (i.e. failed acquisition experience) has little influence. Favorable bilateral relationships may not improve the completion rate and efficiency of state-owned firms, but high-quality host country institutions lead to a higher likelihood of CBA completion among state-owned firms; however, this may be not conducive to decreasing the time needed to complete an acquisition deal.
Originality/value
First, by discussing the completion rate and duration of CBAs conducted by state-owned firms and analyzing the factors that influence them, this paper enriches and develops the theory of organizational overseas mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Second, by adopting a legitimacy perspective and integrating institutional theory, the authors theorize how state-owned status influences firms’ M&A completion rate and time and test the hypotheses empirically; thus, this paper improves and deepens institutional theory. Third, by discussing how different types of experience (i.e. successful experience vs failed acquisition experience) influence the acquisition completion rate and duration and how general experience and specific types of experience affect these two dependent variables differently, this paper explains how state-owned firms can learn effectively from experience, contributing to organizational learning theory.