2017
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0180754
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From rationality to cooperativeness: The totally mixed Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

Abstract: In this research, the social behavior of the participants in a Prisoner's Dilemma laboratory game is explained on the basis of the quantal response equilibrium concept and the representation of the game in Markov strategies. In previous research, we demonstrated that social interaction during the experiment has a positive influence on cooperation, trust, and gratefulness. This research shows that the quantal response equilibrium concept agrees only with the results of experiments on cooperation in Prisoner’s D… Show more

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Cited by 7 publications
(18 citation statements)
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“…PD has one Nash equilibrium: it is a mutual choice of Defect strategy which gives the payoff of 1 for two players. However, laboratory experiments show that people in some conditions avoid Nash equilibrium 9,26 . For example, under social framing, individuals may start to choose more frequently the Cooperate strategy, a sort of behavior that could be considered irrational.…”
Section: Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…PD has one Nash equilibrium: it is a mutual choice of Defect strategy which gives the payoff of 1 for two players. However, laboratory experiments show that people in some conditions avoid Nash equilibrium 9,26 . For example, under social framing, individuals may start to choose more frequently the Cooperate strategy, a sort of behavior that could be considered irrational.…”
Section: Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These two variables imply that individuals' strategies at round 𝑡 − 1 determine completely their behavior at round 𝑡. This model will be referred as PD in Markov strategies 26,30 , and for brevity we will refer to subsequent 𝛾 and 𝛼 as Markov strategies.…”
Section: Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
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