From Rebels to Soldiers: An Analysis of the Philippine and East Timorese Policy Integrating Former Moro National Liberation Front and Falintil Combatants into the Armed Forces

Meta-síntesis: Identidad y Reintegración de Excombatientes y Veteranos de Guerras Civiles en Acuerdos de Paz

“…Para muchos excombatientes su identidad de soldado es objeto de aprobación social por ciertos grupos y esto les da un estatus que prevalece en y fuera del conflicto armado. Una consecuencia de esa aprobación es que, cuando los soldados se reconocen y agrupan, comparten en camaradería sus remembranzas y hablan temas que con otros no lo hacen (Hall, 2009). Sin embargo, esa identidad de soldado que pareciera encarnada e inamovible puede cambiar cuando el soldado se aleja de zonas militarizadas y negocia otras identidades (Atwood, 2002).…”

Military integration and intelligence capacity: informational effects of incorporating former rebels

“…Cooperation between MNLF units and the military began even before the peace process was finalized, as the government began 'to exploit the MNLF intelligence network and use its firepower' to help respond to and resolve 'critical incidents' including high-profile kidnappings and hostage-taking by the extremist Abu Sayyaf Group and MNLF dissidents (Lara 2012, 104). The military eventually integrated 5,750 people from the MNLF, while 1,750 joined the police (Caramés Boada 2009, 11), 8 though not every integree was an ex-combatant, since some MNLF fighters had their relatives join in their place (Hall 2014). Santos (2010b, 163) states that 'independent appraisals' found the 7,000 integrated former MNLF combatants 'served as a vital and trusted link between the security forces and the community.'…”

“…Santos (2010b, 163) states that 'independent appraisals' found the 7,000 integrated former MNLF combatants 'served as a vital and trusted link between the security forces and the community.' The military put processes in place to try to ensure cultural sensitivity to Muslim ex-rebels (Hall 2014;Santos 2010b), and even set up a special office to handle issues between lowerranking integrees and senior officers (Santos 2010b, 171-72), aiming to build trust with the integrated fighters.…”

“…The MNLF never fully demobilized, and several factions were not interested in participating in the peace process or cooperating with the state (Hall 2014;Lara 2012). Even so, the relative success of integrating ex-MNLF fighters without full implementation of the peace agreement led the Philippines government to adopt military integration more broadly, for instance integrating into the military 246 members of the Cordillera People's Liberation Army after years of a stalled peace process (ICG 2013;Santos 2010a, 145-46).…”