From regressive pollution taxes to progressive environmental tax reforms

Chiroleu‐Assouline, Mireille; Fodha, Mouez

doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2013.12.006

Cited by 107 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…Agents are all risk neutral 7 and leisure is supposed to be weakly separable from consumption utility. 8 This enables us to solve the model analytically. Clean goods and dirty goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes in a composite commodity of quantity Q = q(C, D).…”

Section: Consumption Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…we do not take the government budget constraint (11) into account. We thus define the partial equilibrium of the model as a tuple (l * , H * , θ * , w * L , w * H , f * l , y * ) that satisfies the following conditions: the job creation condition (7), the wage mark up equation (10), the Beveridge curve (6), the high-skilled labor supply (4), firms' labor demands (7)(8) and finally, the production function (5). Due to the properties of the matching function, it is not possible here to solve explicitly the equilibrium of this economy in levels.…”

Section: The Government Budget Constraintmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Environmental tax reform and income distribution with imperfect heterogeneous labour markets

Aubert

Chiroleu‐Assouline

2019

European Economic Review

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This paper investigates the distributional and efficiency consequences of an environmental tax reform, when the revenue from the green tax is recycled by varying labor tax rates. We build a general equilibrium model with imperfect heterogeneous labor markets, pollution consumption externalities, and non-homothetic preferences (Stone-Geary utility). We show that in the case where the reform appears to be regressive, the gains from the double dividend can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive non-linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. Moreover, the increase of progressivity acts on unemployment and can moderate the trade-off between equity and efficiency. We finally provide numerical illustrations for three European countries featuring different labor market behaviors. We show that a double dividend may be obtained without worsening the initial inequalities if the green tax revenues are redistributed with a progressivity index lower for UK than for France and Germany.

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Section: Consumption Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Government Budget Constraintmentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental tax reform and income distribution with imperfect heterogeneous labour markets

Aubert

Chiroleu‐Assouline

2019

European Economic Review

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“…In particular, Fullerton and Monti () study the conditions under which tax rebates can protect low wage earners, while Chiroleu‐Assouline and Fodha () characterize the tax‐revenue recycling mechanisms allowing for Pareto‐improving environmental tax reforms.…”

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confidence: 99%

Trade, environment, and income inequality: An optimal taxation approach

Bontems

Gozlan

2018

J Public Economic Theory

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In a small open economy, how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly? And how does trade liberalization affect the economy's levels of pollution and inequalities, when taxes are optimally and endogenously adjusted? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor) and pollution, this paper characterizes the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies) with both production and consumption externalities. While optimal income taxes are not directly affected by environmental externalities, conditions are derived under which under-or over-internalization of social marginal damage is optimal for redistributive considerations. Assuming that redistribution operates in favor of the unskilled workers and that the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, simulations suggest that trade liberalization involves a clear trade-off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is only production; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality. Finally, an increase in the willingness to redistribute income towards the unskilled results paradoxically in less pollution and more income inequalities.JEL: H21, H23, F13, F18

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“…Yates [26] points out the importance of progressive taxes for universal health problems. Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha [27] reveal the consequences of different environmental tax policies and propose the idea of tax reforms, from regressive pollution taxes to progressive environmental taxes. Orsi [28] believes that one way to achieve sustainable development is to impose a progressive tax on consumer goods, especially those that have adverse effects on the environment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon Reduction Strategies Based on an NW Small-World Network with a Progressive Carbon Tax

Huang

Liu

2017

Sustainability

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Abstract:There is an increasingly urgent need to reduce carbon emissions. Devising effective carbon tax policies has become an important research topic. It is necessary to explore carbon reduction strategies based on the design of carbon tax elements. In this study, we explore the effect of a progressive carbon tax policy on carbon emission reductions using the logical deduction method. We apply experience-weighted attraction learning theory to construct an evolutionary game model for enterprises with different levels of energy consumption in an NW small-world network, and study their strategy choices when faced with a progressive carbon tax policy. The findings suggest that enterprises that adopt other energy consumption strategies gradually transform to a low energy consumption strategy, and that this trend eventually spreads to the entire system. With other conditions unchanged, the rate at which enterprises change to a low energy consumption strategy becomes faster as the discount coefficient, the network externality, and the expected adjustment factor increase. Conversely, the rate of change slows as the cost of converting to a low energy consumption strategy increases.

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From regressive pollution taxes to progressive environmental tax reforms

Cited by 107 publications

References 51 publications

Environmental tax reform and income distribution with imperfect heterogeneous labour markets

Environmental tax reform and income distribution with imperfect heterogeneous labour markets

Trade, environment, and income inequality: An optimal taxation approach

Carbon Reduction Strategies Based on an NW Small-World Network with a Progressive Carbon Tax

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