From secessionism to regionalism: Intra-organizational change and ideological moderation within armed secessionist movements

Qualitative methods III: On different ways of describing our work

“…Similarly, Faulconbridge and Muzio (2015) tell us that we should examine other cases in order to know whether the results of their study hold true elsewhere. So do Hacking and Flynn (2018) and Sindre (2018). This is in line with what we might expect from qualitative researchers whose necessarily small sample sizes make them especially cautious about generalisation.…”

Electoral Performance by Post-Rebel Parties

“…With so many disparate post-rebel parties consistently participating in elections, what do we know about their electoral performance? Scholars have begun to examine these parties’ electoral fortunes and the implications for lasting peace and democratic outcomes (Allison 2006, 2010; Dresden 2015; Ishiyama and Marshall 2015; Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013, 2017; Manning 2008; Manning and Smith 2016; Marshall 2017; Matanock 2018; Ogura 2011; Sindre 2016a, 2016b, 2018; Sindre and Soderstrom 2016; Soderberg Kovacs and Hatz, 2016; Sprenkels 2018; M. Whiting 2016; S. Whiting 2016; and the contributions to this special issue). However, very few comparative studies have investigated the correlates of these parties’ electoral performance systematically over an extended period of time, particularly in a larger-N comparative context (these include, to our knowledge, Dresden 2015; Ishiyama and Widmeier 2017; Manning and Smith 2016).…”

Adapting to Peacetime Politics? Rebranding and Ideological Change in Former Rebel Parties

“…As demands for territorial sovereignty and commitments to electoral democracy are not mutually exclusive, it is not a prerequisite that secessionist groups abandon their radical secessionism as a goal for a peace settlement to come into effect or, indeed, for groups to be considered 'moderate' (Whiting: 2016). That said, as has been suggested elsewhere (Whiting 2016;Sindre 2018), it is reasonable to assume that a peace settlement in which armed groups opt to settle without the core issues of the conflict being 'resolved', may prove less stable than in contexts where former rebel groups shifted their position on this dimension towards accepting -or endorsing -a form of autonomy. For instance, to groups such as Sinn Fein, the transition 'from bullets to ballots' reflects the decision to shift the struggle from armed to non-armed mobilization and push for reunification via democratic means at a time when it had become evident that continued armed engagement 'threatened the group's popularity within its constituency and access to political dialogue and, ultimately, political power' (Berti 2013,175).…”

“…During what is often described as the final phase of the armed conflict, from 1998 to 2004, this discourse of ethnic differentiation became less dominant and was replaced with an increased emphasis on pluralism and democracy, which in part came about as the result of the strengthening of the political wing and alliance with civil society (Sindre 2018: 28–9). Hence, the GAM case illustrates a shift in discourse away from focusing on ethnic differentiation from the ‘Javanese-dominated Indonesian state’ towards emphasizing democracy, ethnic pluralism and human rights as a basis of their claim to self-determination already before the signing of the MoU and thereby also before taking part in elections (Sindre 2018: 30). The emergence of a moderate wing within the movement and the organizational evolution of GAM into a social political movement with a strong civilian base had led to an internal shift in the balance of power towards moderates that pushed for increased regionalism rather than secession.…”

“…While some movements, such as the Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland have retained their goal of seeking secession, the majority of such parties have formally abandoned their goal of independence, as exemplified by the multiple wartime contenders in the civil war in the former Yugoslavia and most secessionist conflicts in South and Southeast Asia. 2 As has been suggested elsewhere, the shift from propagating a secessionist ideology to endorsing regionalism suggests a weakening in the saliency of the main conflict cleavages, namely the relationship between the region and the state and between the ethnic minority and majority communities (Massetti and Schakel 2016, 60;Sindre 2018). But to what extent is this shift in the overarching goal of the movements accompanied by a transition towards more inclusive ideologies?…”