From Secular Stagnation to Robocalypse? Implications of Demographic and Technological Changes

Abstract

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Economic Consequences of High Public Debt: Evidence from Three Large Scale DSGE Models

“…11 Woo and Kumar (2015), Ostry et al (2015). 12 Chalk and Tanzi (2004), Checherita and Rother (2012).…”

Real-time Weakness of the Global Economy: A First Assessment of the Coronavirus Crisis

“…For the sake of space, the estimated probability of low growth regime is plotted in Chart A of Figure 10 in the Online Appendix. The model attains a high probability of low growth only to the slowdown associated to the Great Recession, and fails to detect other periods of negative (2012)(2013) or weak (2001)(2002)(2003)(2004) output growth. This is because during the Great Recession, the Euro Area exhibited an unprecedented deterioration in real activity, which fully dominates the estimated low mean growth.…”

Loan Types and the Bank Lending Channel

“…loan types. This figure is constructed using the four loan types for the last quarter of 2004,2008, and 2012. The sample corresponds to the full credit registry, 16 These differences in the use of one or more loan types do not appear related to borrowing from one or more banks.…”

“…For Spain, we find that the majority of borrowers rely on one loan type: in 2004, this number was 60%, and it increases slightly in later years. For Peru, we can see that at least prior to the financial crisis (that is, before the "Peruvian miracle" period) a large fraction of the borrowers relied on a limited number of loan types: in 2004 borrower has a given loan type (indicated in columns). The sample is conditional on the borrower remaining in the credit registry sample at the end of the period.…”