Japan's level of defense spending relative to the size of its economy has been anomalously low among the major industrialized countries. Much of the literature on Japan's national security suggests that antimilitarist public sentiment constraints Japanese defense budgeting. A substantial amount of research is methodologically descriptive and the policy impact of Japanese public opinion is largely presumed but not closely tested. This study tested the relationship between Japanese public opinion and defense spending. In the process of testing, the existing measurement theory, which has accounted for cases in Western Europe and the Unites States, has been found inadequate to explain the Japanese causal link. With the introduction of alternative measurements, this study found that Japanese public opinion does uniquely constrain defense budget decisions.
Keywords: Defense spending, Democratic control, Representation, Public preferences, Public opinionFor decades, scholars have been puzzled over Japan's reluctance to become a military power commensurate to its economic capacity. Constructivist scholars emphasize that Japan's post-World War II antimilitarist norms have constrained Japanese national security policy (Beger, 1993;Chai, 1997; Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993). Realist scholars argue that the structural and material forces will outweigh antimilitarist norms (Layne, 1993; Waltz 1993) or utility-driven Japan is riding on the back of the United States for military security (Lind, 2004). Is there any evidence that the structural and material forces have always underlain Japan's antimilitarist norms or have these norms trumped the immediate utility of material forces?This article contributes to the debate by examining the budgetary effects of public opinion, which can be seen as an indicator of antimilitarist norms. It has found that both material calculations and normative considerations significantly affect defense budget decisions, implying that the two modes of influence are not mutually exclusive. It can be assumed that decision-makers routinely reason about both material forces and normative choices. A significant breakthrough for the debate would be to offer evidence as to the ways in which antimilitarist norms interact with material calculations.The study in this article argues that the domestic variable of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)-tied spending (which reflects a widely shared expectation of antimilitarism) and its compliance mechanisms (which serve as the one percent of GDP ceiling) permit a reliable prediction of changes in representative defense budgeting. In its defense spending, the Japanese state is thus weakly autonomous from society. As constructivists suggest, domestic norms and other social structures may be considered as capable of constraining Japan's defense budgeting. This article claims that norms do not have the independent causal effect on defense spending but rather require institutional motives and material factors for policy makers to comply with norms. Greater attention to ...