2006
DOI: 10.1348/147608305x68057
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From the repression of contents to the rules of the (narrative) self: A present‐day cognitive view of the Freudian phenomenon of repressed contents

Abstract: In psychoanalysis, it is commonly thought that ideas (desires, fears, etc.) may be repressed, and that they can be made conscious. In this article, we shall apply cognitive viewpoints and assert that ideas do not exist in the unconscious as 'ready made', and thus repressed ideas cannot be 'brought' into consciousness. We suggest that the contents of consciousness are formed by processes on four levels: (1) unconscious brain processes, (2) the level of consciousness, (3) the level of self-consciousness, and (4)… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…The cornerstone of this theory was that subsequently emerging contents (e.g. in psychic disorders, therapy and even 'slips of the tongue') pre-existed in an unconscious form (Talvitie and Tiitinen, 2006) but were intentionally excluded from conscious awareness. Boag (2007) argued that repression is a coherent explanatory mechanism for the inhibition of unwanted memories, and furthermore posited that 'neural inhibition', evidence for which is supported by recent developments in neuroscience, may be triggered by social factors and can account for Freudian repression.…”
Section: Repressed Knowingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The cornerstone of this theory was that subsequently emerging contents (e.g. in psychic disorders, therapy and even 'slips of the tongue') pre-existed in an unconscious form (Talvitie and Tiitinen, 2006) but were intentionally excluded from conscious awareness. Boag (2007) argued that repression is a coherent explanatory mechanism for the inhibition of unwanted memories, and furthermore posited that 'neural inhibition', evidence for which is supported by recent developments in neuroscience, may be triggered by social factors and can account for Freudian repression.…”
Section: Repressed Knowingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…By assessing the process of creating a subjective narrative, researchers and clinicians access information central to the very difficulties thought to underlie clients’ presenting problems. Such information is not necessarily provided through self‐report, particularly when individuals lack insight into their relational difficulties and representational processes due to defensive processes that protect them from experiencing potentially overwhelming or unbearable thoughts and emotions (Bowlby, ; Mascolo & Fischer, ; Talvitie & Tiitinen, ; Westen, ). Assessment of change in ability to describe the SBS may be particularly useful since an inability to mentalize about this type of interpersonal process may be specifically associated with mental health difficulties.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At the same time as the constructionist movement in modern psychology goes well beyond the 'cognitive turn' (cf. Talvitie & Tiitinen, 2006), that movement has opened up a useful but still limited space for addressing the nature of our knowledge of subjectivity (e.g. Gergen, 1985).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%