Frontier Government: The Folding of the Canada-US Border

O’Connor, Daniel; Lint, Willem de

doi:10.26522/ssj.v3i1.1023

Cited by 11 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Canadians' relationship to the empire is particularly intense, as has already been noted with regard to trade (see Clarkson, 2008; O'Connor & de Lint, 2009). On defense and security issues, our integration into the metropolis is at least as great, and has grown further in the last decade (see Byers, 2007).…”

Section: The Broad Perspectivementioning

confidence: 80%

“…The goal was to manage "a border that securely facilitates the free flow of people and commerce" (DFAIT, 2001). In the years since, and in cooperation with the Mexican government, this program was broadened into a trilateral "Security and Prosperity Partnership" (SPP) that has had limited success in facilitating transit of merchandise and even less success in easing movement of people (O'Connor & de Lint, 2009). Through wide-ranging trilateral administrative cooperation, the SPP sought to square the circle of an incompatible pair of premises: the vast integrating ambition of parts of the three countries' business sectors and the implacable political opposition of the corresponding "popular" sectors to further integration (see Council of Canadians, 2007).…”

Section: Trade In the Shadow Of 9/11mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…border wide open is the dominant policy priority of Canadian governments, other than keeping the country united. This is because so much of Canada's economy depends on the United States, through trade and tourism, that trouble at the border has the potential, on its own, to plunge the country into recession—and to keep it there once a recession has begun (Clarkson, 2008; O'Connor & de Lint, 2009).…”

Section: It Is (Almost) All About the Bordermentioning

confidence: 99%

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Friends Again? Canada, Obama, and the Big Picture

Deroanne

2010

Latin American Policy

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For all the euphoria that marked Canadians' reaction to Barack Obama's accession to the U.S. presidency, the Canada–U.S. relationship promises to remain complicated. To make sense of the situation, a sharp distinction must be made between public opinion and the policy orientations of governments. Thus, throughout the Bush years, bilateral relations in key policy areas remained close—and even grew closer—at the same time that hostility of Canadians toward the U.S. administration was extreme. Conversely, several factors—not including broad hemispheric issues, which count for little in the Canada–U.S. relationship—seem likely to dampen bilateral policy enthusiasm through much of Obama's first term, despite his great personal appeal and his better fit near the center of the Canadian political spectrum. Parallel and competing domestic priorities can have adverse effects on bilateral trade, which accounts for a large part of the Canadian economy; the partnership is far from natural between the Obama White House and the Conservative government of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and while Obama is ramping up U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan, Canada is seeking to get out. Still, Canadians seem ready to absorb important policy differences in the face of what they overwhelmingly believe to be the big picture: that Barack Obama is good for the United States and for the world. A pesar de toda la euforia que acompañó la reacción de los canadienses en la toma de posesión de Barack Obama a la presidencia estadounidense, la relación entre Canadá y Estados Unidos promete seguir complicada. Para entender la situación, debe hacerse una gran distinción entre la opinión pública y las orientaciones políticas de los gobiernos. Así, durante los años con Bush, las relaciones bilaterales en áreas clave de la política se mantuvieron cercanas—y se acercaron todavía más—a la vez que la hostilidad de los canadienses hacia la administración estadounidense fue extrema. Por otro lado, varios factores—que no incluyen los asuntos hemisféricos, mismos que importan poco en la relación Canadá–EU—parecen desalentar el entusiasmo por la política bilateral durante la mayor parte de la primera gestión de Obama, a pesar de su carisma personal y de encajar mejor al centro del espectro político canadiense. Cabe notar, que las prioridades domésticas paralelas y concurrentes pueden tener efectos adversos en el comercio bilateral, el cual abarca gran parte de la economía canadiense; la convivencia entre la Casa Blanca de Obama y el gobierno Conservador del Primer Ministro Stephen Harper está lejos de ser natural, y mientras que Obama aumenta el compromiso militar en Afganistán, Canadá busca salirse de ahí. Aun así, los canadienses parecen estar dispuestos a absorber las diferencias en políticas importantes ante lo que ellos abrumadoramente creen es el asunto mayor: que Barack Obama es bueno para Estados Unidos y para el mundo.

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Section: The Broad Perspectivementioning

confidence: 80%

Section: Trade In the Shadow Of 9/11mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: It Is (Almost) All About the Bordermentioning

confidence: 99%

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Friends Again? Canada, Obama, and the Big Picture

Deroanne

2010

Latin American Policy

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“…Coding techniques can identify potential threats, such as the characteristics that make households vulnerable to food-insecurity, and pre-emptive actions can work to prevent the threat from actualizing. Similar techniques are used to code travellers to identify potential drug couriers or terror threats, to code defendants to identify those not likely to appear at trial, and to code critical infrastructure to identify potential vulnerabilities or ‘soft spots’ and suspicious elements (such as unattended bags at airports) (O’Connor and De Lint, 2009). The aim of pre-emptive security is to identify threats before disruptions and undesirable outcomes materialize.…”

Section: Theorizing Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Living with insecurity: Food security, resilience, and the World Food Programme (WFP)

O’Connor¹,

Boyle²,

Ilcan

et al. 2016

Global Social Policy

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As the world’s largest humanitarian organization fighting hunger, and primary expositor of food insecurity in sub-Saharan Africa, the World Food Programme’s (WFP) activities offer a unique opportunity to examine the contemporary food-security nexus. In this article, we examine the ‘turn’ toward resilience in the practices and policies of the WFP. Our analysis emphasizes that resilience is one of a family of security strategies through which the WFP seeks to govern food security. As such, it is impossible to claim, as some have, that resilience is displacing security as the dominant logic for governing insecurity. Nevertheless, resilience is a cornerstone of the WFPs’ current activities. Whereas more familiar strategies of security attempt to pre-empt or contain disruptive events – in the context of food crises – resilience is a style of thinking that assumes the inevitability of unpredictable, high-impact events and aims to foster the capability for systems and people to adapt, absorb, and bounce back from their effects. Resilience, while championed as part of an overall solution to a range of ills afflicting human populations today, aims only to equip people and populations with the capacity to live with the instabilities of a neoliberal food system without questioning, destabilizing, or resisting the very sources of socio-economic and political instability.

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“…With references to terrorism and international crime, airport security has experienced major adjustments in terms of technological upgrades and policy changes in the past decade (Adey, 2004, 2006; Jones, 2009; Leese and Koenigseder, 2015; Lyon, 2006; Salter, 2008c; Schouten, 2014). Particular emphasis is put on risk-based and preventive approaches, some of which are triggered long before passengers actually arrive at the airport (Amoore, 2011; Bennett, 2005; Hobbing, 2010; Leese, 2014; O’Connor and de Lint, 2009). As O’Connor and de Lint (2009: 56) argue, “the sequence: danger/fear → precautionary measures + risk assessment → threat aversion is found in practices pursued by an assembly of agencies and […] the effect is a new governance normal”.…”

Section: Airports As High-risk Low-cost Hybridsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governing airport security between the market and the public good

Leese

2015

Criminology & Criminal Justice

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Airport security is increasingly governed in liberal ways, allowing for flexibilized and marketized ways of outsourcing and contracting service provisions to the private sector. This article draws on expert interviews from the aviation sector, finding that liberal security governance at German airports enables public bodies not only to cut costs through competitive tendering practices, but also to relocate accountability for security provision to private companies. The role of the public sector subsequently becomes one of managerialism and audits. However, there is a considerable downside to the promises of market regulation, putting severe hardships on the private security workforce and potentially undermining the quality of service provision. Thus, this article ultimately claims that public bodies should choose not to marketize security, as the value of security itself could be substantially undermined by neoliberal logics.

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Frontier Government: The Folding of the Canada-US Border

Abstract: In this paper the border is evaluated as a fold of power relations in which

Cited by 11 publications

References 7 publications

Friends Again? Canada, Obama, and the Big Picture

Friends Again? Canada, Obama, and the Big Picture

Living with insecurity: Food security, resilience, and the World Food Programme (WFP)

Governing airport security between the market and the public good

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