Full Information Equivalence in Large Elections

Barelli, Paulo; Bhattacharya, Sourav; Siga, Lucas

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3183959

Cited by 11 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…A similar problem is identi…ed by Bhattacharya (2013), who observes the necessity of preference monotonicity for information aggregation; see also Bhattacharya (2018) and Ali, Mihm, and Siga (2017). Barelli, Bhattacharya, and Siga (2018) study what conditions on the joint distributions of states and voters'signals make information aggregation feasible with two or more alternatives. Bouton and Castanheira (2012) show that, in a Poisson election with more than two alternatives, information aggregation fails with most voting rules except for approval voting.…”

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confidence: 87%

Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections

Ekmekçi

Lauermann

2018

SSRN Journal

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The modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, when voters have common interests, elections will aggregate information when the population is large, in any equilibrium. Here, we study the performance of large elections with population uncertainty. We …nd that the modern Condorcet jury theorem holds if and only if the expected number of voters is independent of the state. If the expected number of voters depends on the state, then additional equilibria exist in which information is not aggregated. The main driving force is that, everything else equal, voters are more likely to be pivotal if the population is small.Elections are said to be e¤ective in aggregating information that is dispersed among citizens, for example, about uncertainty regarding future economic prospects, costs and bene…ts of a public good, or the political rami…cations of a trade deal. This belief has been justi…ed by the so-called Condorcet Jury theorem (see Ladha (1992)), which asserts that large electorates choose correct outcomes, and in its modern form by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, Wit (1998), Duggan and Martinelli (2001), and others. Precisely, the modern Condorcet jury theorem states that under weak conditions, in a large voting game with common We are grateful for helpful comments and suggestions from Christian Hellwig, VJ Krishna, and Andrew McLennan. We thank Deniz Kattwinkel and Carl Heese for excellent research assistance.

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confidence: 87%

Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections

Ekmekçi

Lauermann

2018

SSRN Journal

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“…As the negative message mentioned above is led by the impossibility of revealing the inconsistent type, this paper contributes to two other fields: (i) the field of mechanism design that focuses on communication constraints (e.g. Blumrosen andFeldman 2013, Van Zandt 2007), (ii) the field of information aggregation focusing on the consequences of mismatch of type and state spaces (e.g., Schmitz and Tröger 2012, Barelli, Bhattacharya and Siga 2018, Bozbay and Peters 2018. The analysis of the benchmark case is relevant and of particular interest, and I propose abstention as a way to escape from the impossibility.…”

Section: The Case Of Jointly Distributed Private Informationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In that sense, Section 3 of this paper contributes to the literature which studies the effects of relative richness of signal and state spaces to information aggregation; see, e.g.,Schmitz and Tröger (2012),Barelli, Bhattacharya and Siga (2018) andBozbay and Peters (2018). In each of these papers, an efficient Bayesian Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies does not generally exist, though each considers a very different model than the current paper's.3 A quota rule decides on each issue according to whether the number of 'yes' judgments on the issue exceeds a particular quota.…”

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confidence: 98%

Truth-tracking judgment aggregation over interconnected issues

Bozbay

2019

Soc Choice Welf

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This paper analyzes the problem of aggregating individual judgments over two interconnected issues. Voters share a common preference which is state-dependent, but they hold private information about what the state might be. I assume strategic voting in a Bayesian voting game setting and I want to determine voting rules which induce an efficient Bayesian Nash equilibrium in truthful strategies, hence lead to collective judgments that efficiently incorporate all private information. Interconnectedness may lead to private information that is inconsistent with the state, which leads to the impossibility of efficient information aggregation. Once I introduce the possibility of abstention, the negative conclusion no longer prevails and there is always a voting rule which aggregates information efficiently. I obtain a similar positive result when I rule out the possibility of inconsistent private information. I analyze the situations in which such rules exist whenever necessary, as well as the nature of these rules.

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“…A similar problem is identified by Bhattacharya (2013), who observes the necessity of preference monotonicity for information aggregation; see also Bhattacharya (2018) and Ali et al (2017). Barelli et al (2018) study what conditions on the joint distributions of states and voters' signals make information aggregation feasible with two or more alternatives. Bouton and Castanheira (2012) show that, in a Poisson election with more than two alternatives, information aggregation fails with most voting rules except for approval voting.…”

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confidence: 99%