Fully absorbing dynamic compromise

Richter, Michael

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.013

Cited by 22 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Overall, the literature on multilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo is split between papers that assume a continuous (divide-a-dollar) policy space and a discrete (e.g., finite) one. Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Kalandrakis (2004Kalandrakis ( , 2010, Baron and Bowen (2015), Richter (2014), Anesi and Seidmann (2014), and Nunnari (2016), among others, assume that the policy space is continuous, while Anesi (2010), Fong (2011, 2012), and Anesi and Duggan (2017) assume a discrete one, as we do. We view the benefit of our approach mainly in that it considerably simplifies the analysis: in fact, the use of the von Neumann-Morgenstern-stable set in all voting models that we are aware of requires a discrete space.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 87%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Political Economy of Redistribution

Diermeier¹,

Egorov²,

Sonin³

2017

Econometrica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is often argued that additional constraints on redistribution such as granting veto power to more players in society better protects property from expropriation. We use a model of multilateral bargaining to demonstrate that this intuition may be flawed. Increasing the number of veto players or raising the supermajority requirement for redistribution may reduce protection on the equilibrium path. The reason is the existence of two distinct mechanisms of property protection. One is formal constraints that allow individuals or groups to block any redistribution that is not in their favor. The other occurs in equilibrium where players without such powers protect each other from redistribution. Players without formal veto power anticipate that the expropriation of other similar players will ultimately hurt them and thus combine their influence to prevent redistributions. In a stable allocation, the society exhibits a “class” structure with class members having equal wealth and strategically protecting each other from redistribution.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 87%

“…An earlier version of the model required that there is no waste, so x t = x 0 = b throughout the game, and the results were identical. In principle, the possibility of waste can alter the set of outcomes in a legislative bargaining model (e.g.,Richter (2014)). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Economy of Redistribution

Diermeier¹,

Egorov²,

Sonin³

2017

Econometrica

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…0 These agreements might, in principle, be explained by social preferences; but Battaglini and Palfrey (like Kalandrakis (2010)) suggest that concavity might be a better explanation. A supramajority of players earn a positive share in (some of) our constructed equilibria, and also in the equilibria constructed by Bowen and Zahran (2012) and Richter (2014):…”

mentioning

confidence: 90%

Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

Anesi

Seidmann

2015

Review of Economic Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This paper studies an extension of the Baron-Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of periods, the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy (which is, in turn, the default for the next period). The model provides a number of quite different predictions. (i) From a positive perspective, the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity. In that case, patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria. By contrast, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs in a unanimity committee coincide with those in the corresponding Baron-Ferejohn framework. (ii) If players have heterogeneous discount factors then a large class of subgame perfect equilibria (including all Markov perfect equilibria) are inefficient.JEL classification: C73, C78, D71, D72.

show abstract

“…The problem immediately encountered in this framework is that existence results for stationary Markov perfect equilibria provided in the extant game-theoretic literature do not apply. The consequence has been a fast growing body of literature consisting of work that explicitly constructs stationary Markovian equilibria for bargaining games with an endogenous status quo, and then analyzes the properties of policy outcomes implied by these constructions (e.g., Baron 1996, Kalandrakis 2004, 2016, Bowen and Zahran 2012, Nunnari 2017, Richter 2014, Baron and Bowen 2016, Zápal 2014, and Anesi and Seidmann 2015. These analyses are an important development in the study of legislative dynamics, but almost all either assume that the space of alternatives is unidimensional or focus on pie-division settings where each bargainer's utility only depends on her own share of the pie.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

Anesi

Duggan

2018

Theoretical Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper studies stationary Markov perfect equilibria in multidimensional models of dynamic bargaining, in which the alternative chosen in one period determines the status quo for the next. We generalize a sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann (2015). We then use this existence result to show that if a weak gradient restriction holds at an alternative, then when players are sufficiently patient, there is a continuum of equilibria with absorbing sets arbitrarily close to that alternative. A sufficient condition for our gradient restriction is that the gradients of all players' utilities are linearly independent at that alternative. When the dimensionality of the set of alternatives is high, this linear independence condition holds at almost all alternatives, and equilibrium absorbing sets are dense in the set of alternatives. This implies that constructive techniques, which are common in the literature, fail to identify many plausible outcomes in dynamic bargaining games.

show abstract

Fully absorbing dynamic compromise

Cited by 22 publications

References 18 publications

Political Economy of Redistribution

Political Economy of Redistribution

Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About