Functional Homology and Functional Variation in Evolutionary Cognitive Science

García, Claudia Lorena

doi:10.1162/biot_a_00036

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Homology and Competing Hypotheses1

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2013

2024

Publication Types

Select...

Article4

Other1

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent5

Authors

Journals

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Wenzel 1992;Love 2007;Ereshefsky 2007;Clark 2009;García 2010;Murphy 2012). A symptom of the difficulty is this: the cladistic approach for identifying homologies cannot always be straightforwardly applied in the domain of psychology.…”

Section: Homology and Competing Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Angry Rats and Scaredy Cats: Lessons from Competing Cognitive Homologies

Wiegman

2016

Biol Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Homology and Competing Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Angry Rats and Scaredy Cats: Lessons from Competing Cognitive Homologies

Wiegman

2016

Biol Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Epistemological issues in neurodivergence and atypical cognition: introduction

García¹,

Mercado

2023

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Cognitive Capacities as Functional Natural Kinds

García,

Salcedo-Gómez,

Vázquez-del-Mercado

2024

Integr. psych. behav.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we articulate a functional approach to cognitive capacities. It is a restricted functionalism for various reasons, but especially because it does not claim that all cognitive (and/or mental) entities and processes are functional in the sense of a systemic capacities approach. One of the central aims of a cognitive theory consists in providing explanations of behavioral phenomena of (human and non-human) animals, and of the phenomena that are involved in those explanations. We accept that part of what lies at the heart of these explanations are certain functional entities –we call them “cognitive functional systems” –which in our view stand for most of the cognitive capacities of an organism; that is, systems that are individuated primarily by the main cognitive functions they undertake. Additionally, in the paper, we go into further detail concerning these functional systems, their internal organization, the nature of their causal interactions, etc. We also argue that some of these classes of cognitive functional systems (i.e., cognitive capacities) can be construed as “natural kinds” whenever their kinds of functional organizations are understood as kinds of hierarchically ordered classes of information processing events that are related among each other in regular (often complex) ways.

show abstract

Functional Homology and Functional Variation in Evolutionary Cognitive Science

Cited by 5 publications

References 23 publications

Angry Rats and Scaredy Cats: Lessons from Competing Cognitive Homologies

Angry Rats and Scaredy Cats: Lessons from Competing Cognitive Homologies

Epistemological issues in neurodivergence and atypical cognition: introduction

Cognitive Capacities as Functional Natural Kinds

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About