Functionalism, Reductionism, and Levels of Reality

Abstract

I consider a problem for functional reductionism, based on the following tension. Say that b is functionally reduced to a. On the one hand, a and b turn out to be identical, and identity is a symmetric relation. On the other hand, functional reductionism implies that a and b are asymmetrically related: if b is functionally reduced to a, then a is not functionally reduced to b. Thus, we ask: how can a and b be asymmetrically related if they are the same thing? I propose a solution to this tension, by distinguishing between ontological levels and levels of description.

Structuralism as a Stance

“…Here I will simply take as given that the language of reduction supports claims about priority. See, e.g.,(Lorenzetti 2023) for a recent attempt at reconciliation of the two terms, or(Rosen 2010, Sec. 10).15 "The fundamental ingredients of nature that appear in the underlying equations are fields: the familiar electromagnetic field, and some twenty or so other fields.…”