Further Investigations into the Factors Affecting Compliance with U.K. Fishing Quotas

Hatcher, Aaron; Gordon, D.

doi:10.3368/le.81.1.71

Cited by 60 publications

(47 citation statements)

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“…Kuperan and Sutinen (1998) found that compliance in a Malaysian fishery depended on the tangible gains and losses, as well as the moral development, legitimacy, and behavior of others in the fishery. Hatcher et al (2000) reached similar conclusions while Hatcher and Gordon (2005) found less evidence in favor of normative influence on fisher compliance, while again confirming the deterrence effect. These studies deal with trawl fisheries where the capital input is substantial, while our study is the first to analyze artisan fishers.…”

Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 61%

“…The fishers in our sample all have low levels of capital input, i.e., they operate simple open wooden-hulled vessels; almost half of the fishers lack motors and have to use sails or paddles to propel their vessels. The theoretical model that we follow is the one which extends the neoclassical utilitarian model of individual violation behavior to include normative and social judgments (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999;Hatcher and Gordon, 2005), of the form…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Regulatory compliance in Lake Victoria fisheries

Eggert

Lokina

2009

Envir. Dev. Econ.

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This paper analyzes the causes for regulatory compliance using traditional deterrence variables and potential moral and social variables. We use self-reported data from Tanzanian artisanal fishers in Lake Victoria. The results indicate that fishers adjust their violation rates with respect to changes in the probability of detection and punishment, but they also react to legitimacy and social variables. A small group of persistent violators react neither to normative aspects nor to traditional deterrence variables, but systematically violate the regulation and use bribes to avoid punishment.JEL classification: K42, L51, Q22

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Section: Methodssupporting

confidence: 61%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory compliance in Lake Victoria fisheries

Eggert

Lokina

2009

Envir. Dev. Econ.

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“…Other veins of research on compliance stress that abidance to rules is a matter of factors related to morality, trust towards other agents, and the expectations of how other people act (see Scholz 1998;Murphy 2004;Hatcher and Gordon 2005).…”

Section: Corruption and Rule Violations: Theoretical Expectations Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users

Sundström

2016

World Development

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Small-scale corruption in government administrations that govern natural resources is believed to have a negative impact on conservation management. Yet, while corruption is said to obstruct the implementation of conservation policies, for instance as bribery may enable poaching in protected reserves, it is an underexplored area of research. This study investigates the effect of corruption, others' compliance behavior, and support for regulations on rule-violating intentions. In a betweensubjects experiment, a sample of resource users active in South African small-scale fisheries (N = 201) answered questions about rule-violating intentions after reading one of four scenarios, each depicting a different situation of corruption among officials that enforce regulations and compliance behavior of other resource users. The results show that resource users are more likely to state rule-violating intentions when corruption among inspectors is widespread. Moreover, there is an interaction effect with support for conservation regulations, suggesting that the effect of corruption is stronger among individuals who do not support such rules. These findings lend further support for the proposition that to improve the effectiveness of conservation policy, more effort is needed to reduce bribery among government officials, such as rangers and inspectors that enforce natural resource regulations.

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“…Kuperan and Sutinen's empirical work (1998) found that compliance in a Malaysian fishery depended on the tangible gains and losses, as well as the moral development, legitimacy, and behavior of others in the fishery (Sutinen et al, 1990). Hatcher et al (2000) made a similar conclusion in regard to fishermen's compliance with quota in the United Kingdom fisheries; a significant positive relationship between perceptions of fairness and levels of compliance was reported though a follow up study confirmed the deterrence effect but found less evidence of normative factors influencing compliance (Hatcher and Gordon, 2005). Similarly, Keane et al (2008), Nielsen (2003), and Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003), communicated how normative factors (e.g., legitimacy of the imposed regulations) influences individual's compliance decisions while Eggert and Lokina (2008) showed the importance of normative variables in addition to deterrence variables in explaining compliance behavior of the Tanzanian Lake Victoria fishers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An individual will violate a regulation if the expected illegal gain exceeds the penalty, which is a function of the size of the fine for non-compliant behavior and the detection rate of a violation (Becker, 1968). Sutinen and Anderson's (1985) seminal conceptual work on law enforcement was followed with empirical papers confirming Becker's original hypothesis (Sutinen and Gauvin, 1989;Bean, 1990;Sutinen et al, 1990;Furlong, 1991;Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998;Hatcher and Gordon, 2005;Shaw, 2005), demonstrating the economic gain often outweighs the penalty. King and Sutinen's (2010) survey of the northeast United States groundfish fleet indicate the deterrence effect of the existing enforcement system is weak; violations had a 32.5% probability of being detected, and if detected, a 33.1% chance of being prosecuted and resulting in a penalty.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Non-compliance With Protected Species Regulations in the Northeast USA Gillnet Fishery

Bisack

Das

2015

Front. Mar. Sci.

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Marine mammals and sea turtles in the United States are protected from commercial fishery interactions under the Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act. To reduce harbor porpoise bycatch in the northeast sink gillnet fishery, fishermen are mandated to attach pingers to their nets in regulated areas. Although, pinger regulations have been in place for over a decade, in practice, enforcement is weak and the penalty for a violation is almost non-existent. In this scenario, the presence of normative factors may motivate a fisherman to comply with the pinger regulation. This study considers both economic and normative factors within a probit framework to explain a fisherman's compliance decision. Model results indicate fishermen who previously violated pinger regulations, who are not completely dependent on gillnet gear and face a lower chance of being detected by an observer, are more likely to violate. Understanding the influence of normative factors on compliance decisions is a key component for higher compliance. That is, incorporation of these factors in the design of policy instruments may achieve higher compliance rates and thus more success in protecting these species. Our model findings were ground-truthed by conducting focus group research with fishermen using pingers; some preliminary findings are shared in the discussion in support of our model results. Finally, these results also suggest observer data can be used to support compliance and enforcement mechanisms in this fishery and possibly other fisheries as well.Keywords: non-compliance, fisheries, normative factors, law enforcement, observer effect, U.S. endangered species, marine mammals INTRODUCTION Non-compliance with regulatory requirements can derail resource management objectives. Biological assessments used to monitor the health of a stock can trigger management responses and regulatory actions when stocks are in danger of over-fishing. In most cases, fisheries and marine mammal management rely on regulatory instruments such as a command-and-control approach, in the form of fishing effort reductions and gear standards to protect the stock. Regulatory instruments direct individuals how to behave; while economic instruments, market based, can be designed with incentives to influence an individual's behavior, to achieve the same desired goal. Therefore, choosing a policy instrument is a strategic choice. Resource managers can use any combination of instruments, however, if goals are not met, non-compliance may be the Bisack and DasUnderstanding Noncompliance with Protected Species Regulations source of failure and not the policy instrument itself; additional policy instruments may not rectify the problem and cause further economic harm. Hence understanding the underlying motivation of behavioral responses to regulations is crucial and may allow us to design more successful policy instruments. In this paper, we examine economic and normative factors that may motivate compliance behavior in the sink gillnet fishery in relation to...

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Further Investigations into the Factors Affecting Compliance with U.K. Fishing Quotas

Cited by 60 publications

References 0 publications

Regulatory compliance in Lake Victoria fisheries

Regulatory compliance in Lake Victoria fisheries

Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users

Understanding Non-compliance With Protected Species Regulations in the Northeast USA Gillnet Fishery

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