Future Contingents, Ockhamism (Retroactivism) and Thomism (Eternalism)

Wojtysiak, Jacek

doi:10.18290/rf.2018.66.4-9en

Cited by 2 publications

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“…"while I am sitting, it is necessary that I am sitting" [pp. [22][23][24][25] in this case the alternative "I am sitting or I am not sitting" is destroyed. Next, he reformulates the two kinds of necessity and calls them: 1) necessity from which "only what is necessary follows"; 2) necessity from which "what is contingent seems to (videtur) follow.…”

Section: Kinds Of Necessitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Then, he refers to Boethius and says that, in his opinion, these kinds of necessities were called by Boethius: simple necessity (necessitas simplex) and necessity of condition (necessitas condicionis) [pp. [24][25], where an example of the first one is that it is necessary that all human beings are mortal, and an example of the latter is that if we see someone walking it is necessary that he/she is walking (Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, V.6; cf. [2, p. 148]).…”

Section: Kinds Of Necessitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…What is more, it seems that medieval thinkers were the ones who established the main approaches to the topic of future contingents (cf. [25]). In this light it is worth collecting and analyzing such approaches, both those leading and those less popular, especially since they can still provide us with new solutions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio

Trepczyński

2020

Studia Humana

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In this paper, the theory of necessity proposed by Robert Grosseteste is presented. After showing the wide range of various kinds of determination discussed by him (connected with: (1) one’s knowledge about the future, (2) predestination, (3) fate, (4) grace, (5) sin and temptation), a different context of Grosseteste’s use of the notion of necessity is analyzed (within logical and metaphysical approaches). At the heart of his theory lie: the definition of necessity, which is that something lacks the capacity (posse) for its opposite, and the distinction between two perspectives within which we can consider necessity: (1) the one according to which the truthfulness of a dictum determines that it cannot be the opposite, (2) a pre- or atemporal one, as if something had not yet begun. On these grounds, Robert explains that God’s omniscience is compatible with contingency, including human free decisions. Robert’s theory is still relevant and useful in contemporary debates, as it can provide strong arguments and enrich discussions, thanks to the twoperspectives approach, which generates nine kinds of positions on the spectrum of determinism and indeterminism.

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Section: Kinds Of Necessitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Kinds Of Necessitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio

Trepczyński

2020

Studia Humana

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God and Chance

Wojtysiak

2020

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Bóg i przypadek W niniejszym tekście analizuję sześć pojęć przypadku (określonych przez Dariusza Łukasiewicza) oraz – dodatkowo – definiuję pojęcie zdarzenia losowego. Odrzucając istnienie zdarzeń całkowicie bezprzyczynowych, zastanawiam się nad relacją zdarzeń losowych do Boga. Moją koncepcję opieram na trzech zasadach: zasadzie jednoczesnego współdziałania, zasadzie komplementarności oraz zasadzie wiedzy pośredniej (w stylu L. de Moliny). Przyjęcie tych trzech zasad pozwala mi pogodzić istnienie klasycznie pojętego Boga (który jest stwórcą i Panem wszelkich zdarzeń) z istnieniem zdarzeń losowych. W ten sposób uzyskuję model alternatywny do modeli proponowanych przez teizmy (bardziej lub mniej) rewizyjne (otwarte), w tym przez teizm probabilistyczny Łukasiewicza.

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Future Contingents, Ockhamism (Retroactivism) and Thomism (Eternalism)

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio

Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio

God and Chance

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