2019
DOI: 10.1093/ia/iiz051
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Future Reserves 2020, the British Army and the politics of military innovation during the Cameron era

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Cited by 12 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…In fact, routine British Army formed reservist unit deployments were proposed in 2011 by senior politicians, assisted by "renegade" ex-regular officers and the proposals gained political traction (Bury, 2019). However, by 2015, the proposals had been successfully resisted (Bury & Catignani, 2019). Research on resistance to the integration of health professionals has demonstrated successful change can be led by senior managers and "renegade" insiders but that it is takes sustained effort over a long period (Reay et al, 2017).…”
Section: Implications For Integrationmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In fact, routine British Army formed reservist unit deployments were proposed in 2011 by senior politicians, assisted by "renegade" ex-regular officers and the proposals gained political traction (Bury, 2019). However, by 2015, the proposals had been successfully resisted (Bury & Catignani, 2019). Research on resistance to the integration of health professionals has demonstrated successful change can be led by senior managers and "renegade" insiders but that it is takes sustained effort over a long period (Reay et al, 2017).…”
Section: Implications For Integrationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, it is very likely that given the time and resource constraints of the army reserve that the level of training is poorer than their regular army counterparts (Bury, 2019). However, the development of training standards, allocation of training resources, and the training assurance regime that the army reserve operate under is largely in the power of the hierarchy of the regular army (Bury & Catignani, 2019; Council of Reserve Forces and Cadets Associations, 2017). Thus, while poor army reserve training is a legitimate concern, it is likely that the workplace identities of the regular army may influence the prioritization and modernization of army reserve training that has often been called for (Mooney & Crackett, 2018;Walker, 1990).…”
Section: Study Limitationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another set of research findings mentioned the FR20 policy in the context of defence expenditure reductions linked to the UK Government's austerity programme. We were warned that “the key aspect that will be responded to is your focus on Reservists as a cost‐cutting measure which is not MOD policy.” Similarly, when we talked about the recruitment problems faced by the reserves there was clear push‐back against the idea that this was a serious issue (despite clear evidence to the contrary; see National Audit Office [NAO], 2018; Bury & Catignani, 2019).…”
Section: Engagement In Practice: Language Terminologies and Discoursementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Reserves are important components in the armed forces of the democracies (Bury, 2019a;Edmunds et al, 2016;Weitz, 2007). 1 During the Cold War, reserves were usually seen as a strategic force to be deployed in large wars, but today reserves have been turned into an essential part of states' "total" military force (Bury & Catignani, 2019;Dandeker et al, 2011;West, 2018). In other words, the shift has been from a historically large static, strategic force to a dynamic, operational force that can be and is used in a wide variety of missions (Whitlock, 2006).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%