2019 Fifth Conference on Mobile and Secure Services (MobiSecServ) 2019
DOI: 10.1109/mobisecserv.2019.8686545
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Future Security of Smart Speaker and IoT Smart Home Devices

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Cited by 11 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Wi-Fi networks remain a key vulnerability for smart homes. For example, Godwin et al [96] showed that it was challenging to break into a common voice-based home assistant using the Bluetooth protocol, but the internal Wi-Fi network could be compromised during device setup. The heterogenous nature of networks inside a home also exacerbates the situation.…”
Section: ) Rq1: Smart Home Device Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Wi-Fi networks remain a key vulnerability for smart homes. For example, Godwin et al [96] showed that it was challenging to break into a common voice-based home assistant using the Bluetooth protocol, but the internal Wi-Fi network could be compromised during device setup. The heterogenous nature of networks inside a home also exacerbates the situation.…”
Section: ) Rq1: Smart Home Device Securitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Eavesdropping [64][65] Node capture and replay attacks [66] Sleep deprivation attack [67] DDoS attack [68] Internet pairing default password [70] Configuration and device authentication [71], [85] Legacy authentication mechanism [72] Exposed services [75] Overprivileged configuration Apps [76], [84] Insecure hardware interfaces [73] OTA Updates and upgradeability weakness [75][76] Critical vulnerabilities: side channel, spyware, and backdoor pin code injection [83] Voice spoofing [79] Communal acts like renting, lending, etc. [80] Hardware-level attacks [82] COTS obsolescence risk [81] RQ2: Network Authentication and communication [87], [89] Default password [85][86] Insecure protocols [24], [91] Susceptibility to MITM attack [88][89], [95] Inappropriate use of encryption [94] Protocol attacks [96], [106] Relay attack [97] Sensitive data [100] Prospective attacks [98][99] Social engineering [99] RQ3: Cloud Information disclosure and access control [116][117] Authentication and verification [119], [94] Exploitable services [112]…”
Section: Rq1: Devicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…83 Another goal that can be attained through traffic analysis is detecting the presence of an individual in the house hosting the smart speaker, even if they are not interacting with the device, as shown in Caputo et al 72,73 While those attacks may be conducted from a remote location, attacks conducted through Bluetooth, that is, in the immediate surroundings of the device, do not appear to be an issue, depending on the adoption of the latest versions of the operating system and patches. 69 Moving to the attacks conducted in the house, or at least as close to the smart speaker as its hearing capabilities allow, we see papers examining the possibility of faking or twisting voice commands. An attempt to classify the risks associated with voice commands is performed in Burym et al, 75 which lists the reuse of the recorded voice, the undue activation of the device, or the control of the device itself.…”
Section: Vulnerabilitiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…New ideas also involve speakers and voice assistants in the interaction between residents and the IoT system. In [89] was presented "hands-on" testing for echo functions available from Amazon device.…”
Section: E Virtual Reality and Roboticsmentioning
confidence: 99%