“…Notable exceptions are Armantier et al (2013) who explore auction design for the U.S. Treasury's disposal of troubled assets and Keser et al (2017) who experimentally examine rating agency regulation. 1 For relatively recent studies, see Haruvy and Noussair (2006), Bossaerts et al (2007), Haruvy et al (2007), Bossaerts et al (2010), Palan (2010), Cheung and Palan (2012), Kirchler et al (2012), Sutter et al (2012), Huber and Kirchler (2012), Cheung et al (2014), Füllbrunn et al (2014a), Füllbrunn et al (2014b), Noussair et al (2016), Bao et al (2017), Holt et al (2017), Bosch-Rosa et al (2018), Crockett et al (2018), and Kopányi-Peuker and .…”