2011
DOI: 10.1007/s10588-011-9096-4
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Game analysis of technology innovation alliance stability based on knowledge transfer

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Cited by 7 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…This firm will be able to improve its position with and without alliance. In another study, Jiang and Hao (2013) introduced asymmetric learning as a factor for technology innovation alliance (TIA) instability. In his opinion, partners are more tolerant of sharing profits with each other when their knowledge acquisition in the TIA is symmetric rather than asymmetric.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This firm will be able to improve its position with and without alliance. In another study, Jiang and Hao (2013) introduced asymmetric learning as a factor for technology innovation alliance (TIA) instability. In his opinion, partners are more tolerant of sharing profits with each other when their knowledge acquisition in the TIA is symmetric rather than asymmetric.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They find that the participants will share the cumulative amount of knowledge in the leader-follower differential games; the optimal profits of agents and principal are increased as time progressed, and the agents' effort level of knowledge sharing eventually tending to stability. Jiang and Hao [41] establish a two stages decision-making model to investigate the influence of ownership level and learning ability on the stability of technology innovation alliance from the perspective of knowledge transfer. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium in their model can reveal when the parties decide to maintain or terminate the alliance.…”
Section: Knowledge Sharing Behavior Among Enterprisesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, return expectations of the members, indeterminacy of the external environment and negative externality exert unfavorable effects on the stability of the Alliance. Jiang & Hao [28] analyzes the cooperation and stability of the Alliance by employing game theory. Song & Huang [29] have analyses on the stability of strategic alliance by applying hawk-dove game model in the perspective of asymmetric cooperation.…”
Section: ) Studies On the Quantitative Analysis Of The Stability Of mentioning
confidence: 99%