Game analysis on the evolution of COVID-19 epidemic under the prevention and control measures of the government

Wei, Jinyu; Wang, Li; Yang, Xin

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0240961

Cited by 21 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Since the outbreak of COVID-19, several studies have analyzed the impacts of government policies on the public [28][29][30]. For example, Wei et al (2020) [30] applied the interaction strategies and the evolutionary game analysis of the actions taken by the government and the public. Their study demonstrated that emergency response adopted by the government in the early stages of the pandemic could effectively contain the spread.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Anatomy into the battle of supporting or opposing reopening amid the COVID-19 pandemic on Twitter: A temporal and spatial analysis

Erfani

Wang

et al. 2021

PLoS ONE

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Reopening amid the COVID-19 pandemic has triggered a battle on social media. The supporters perceived that the lockdown policy could damage the economy and exacerbate social inequality. By contrast, the opponents believed it was necessary to contain the spread and ensure a safe environment for recovery. Anatomy into the battle is of importance to address public concerns, beliefs, and values, thereby enabling policymakers to determine the appropriate solutions to implement reopening policy. To this end, we investigated over 1.5 million related Twitter postings from April 17 to May 30, 2020. With the aid of natural language processing (NLP) techniques and machine learning classifiers, we classified each tweet into either a “supporting” or “opposing” class and then investigated the public perception from temporal and spatial perspectives. From the temporal dimension, we found that both political and scientific news that were extensively discussed on Twitter led to the perception of opposing reopening. Further, being the first mover with full reopen adversely affected the public reaction to reopening policy, while being the follower or late mover resulted in positive responses. From the spatial dimension, the correlation and regression analyses suggest that the state-level perception was very likely to be associated with political affiliation and health value.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since the outbreak of COVID-19, several studies have analyzed the impacts of government policies on the public [ 28 – 30 ]. For example, Wei et al (2020) [ 30 ] applied the interaction strategies and the evolutionary game analysis of the actions taken by the government and the public.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anatomy into the battle of supporting or opposing reopening amid the COVID-19 pandemic on Twitter: A temporal and spatial analysis

Erfani

Wang

et al. 2021

PLoS ONE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This term has some analogies to the mechanism of purely reactive awareness-based models but which do not consider the other factors detailed above [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12]. A similar implementation of this term is often present in the payoffs of imitationbased game-theoretic models [14,16,[22][23][24]. Finally, the last term reduces the payoff to account for the immediate and accumulated social, psychological, and economic costs associated with the adoption of self-protective behaviors [15,47].…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several efforts have been proposed across similar research avenues, although with different and narrower angles. For example, imitation mechanisms [14,16,22,23] rely on a population-level modeling that can capture only limited features of such complex behavioral dynamics. Recently, an individual-level imitation-driven mechanism that accounts for the perceived risk of infection and immediate costs for adopting protective behaviors has been proposed and analyzed, showing that it may generate sustained steady oscillations [24].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game-theoretic modeling of collective decision making during epidemics

Zino

Rizzo

et al. 2021

Phys. Rev. E

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“…Kabir et al proposed a novel epidemic model associated with behavioral dynamics under the EGT by considering the two-body system, and they agreed that the funds spent on the individual level as an "emergency relief-package" can reduce the infection and improve quarantine policy success (19). Wei et al established transmission frequency equations, which combined the interaction strategies and the evolutionary game analysis of the actions taken by the government and the public, and found that the emergency response strategy adopted by the government in the early days of the epidemic can effectively control the spread of the epidemic (20). All the above studies combined epidemiological research with game theory, which provided enlightenment for current and future epidemic prevention.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Reach a Regional Cooperation Mechanism to Deal With the Epidemic: An Analysis From the Game Theory Perspective

Yang

Yao

et al. 2021

Front. Public Health

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The outbreak and persistence of COVID-19 have posed a great threat to global public health and economic development. The continuous economic deterioration has been intensified due to the continuous prevention and control measures, such as closed management. Insisting on the prevention of the epidemic or economic restart has become a dilemma for all countries. Epidemic prevention is not only the main behavior of a single country but also a common problem faced by all countries in the region. Continuous prevention measures will affect economic development, but an early restart of the economy is faced with the recurrence of the epidemic. To avoid the emergence of prisoner's dilemma in the governance of the epidemic, each country cannot make decisions with its optimization, and so it is necessary to build a regional cooperation mechanism to achieve the overall optimization of the economy and prevent the epidemic. Based on the game theory, we analyzed the behavior of countries when carrying out regional cooperation to govern the epidemic and put forward specific cooperative income distribution schemes according to the different attributes of the countries. Our results showed that in the presence of population mobility, regional cooperation to govern the epidemic can minimize the total number of infected people and maximize the overall utility of the region, which was significantly better than the overall benefits of the region in the case of non-cooperation. However, in detail, the smaller the difference of preference for preventing and controlling the epidemic between the two, the more likely it is to lead to a win-win situation. Otherwise, there will be one with damaged interests. When damaged interests appear, the appropriate distribution of cooperative income to the country with a small economic scale and low preference in preventing the epidemic is more conducive to the achievement of cooperative mechanisms and the realization of a win-win situation in the region.

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Game analysis on the evolution of COVID-19 epidemic under the prevention and control measures of the government

Cited by 21 publications

References 14 publications

Anatomy into the battle of supporting or opposing reopening amid the COVID-19 pandemic on Twitter: A temporal and spatial analysis

Anatomy into the battle of supporting or opposing reopening amid the COVID-19 pandemic on Twitter: A temporal and spatial analysis

Game-theoretic modeling of collective decision making during epidemics

How to Reach a Regional Cooperation Mechanism to Deal With the Epidemic: An Analysis From the Game Theory Perspective

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