Game model and algorithm for electric vehicle aggregations in pool market and retail market

Game-based strategy for load service entity to level Duck Chart as well as gain EV consumers

“…This paper adds an algorithm for each LSE on how to make continuous adjustments according to other participants' behaviors. To this end, we employ the price strategy game model between EVAs, proposed in my former papers [18,19], and we develop the study by devising EV charging schemes optimized by the consumers instead of EVAs. However, the algorithm use two-way communication between the LSE and consumers, which has the possibility of making optimization problems using numerical methods very difficult and time consuming to resolve as the number of EVs increases.…”

“…With regard to guaranteeing the market share, profit-pursuing LSEs should make continuous adjustments and corrections to the externality costs on the basis of the competitions' externality strategies and the net load externality. To this end, we employ the price strategy game model between EVAs, proposed in my former papers [18,19], and we develop the study by devising EV charging schemes optimized by the consumers instead of EVAs. This paper will demonstrate the dynamic Stackelberg game model between LSE and EV consumers, and a complete simultaneous information game model between LSEs.…”