Game modeling and policy research on the system dynamics-based tripartite evolution for government environmental regulation

Duan, Wei; Li, Changqing; Zhang, Pei; Chang, Qing

doi:10.1007/s10586-016-0642-1

Cited by 48 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…To analyze the feedback structure of the game, some studies used system dynamics (SD) to analyze the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) and achieved good results (e.g. Tian et al 2014;Liu et al 2015;Duan et al 2016). Hence, SD can provide a solution to balance the interests of tripartite stakeholders and improve quality supervision work.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

System Dynamics Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory for Quality Supervision Among Construction Stakeholders

Guo

Zhang

Yang

2018

Journal of Civil Engineering and Management

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To address the gap, that is, few studies have explored the influence of the participants’ interactions with one another during construction quality supervision, this paper proposes a system dynamics model based on evolutionary game theory to describe the complex and dynamic interactions among tripartite stakeholders in China, including the project owner (PO), construction supervising engineer (CSE), and construction contractor (CC). First, the replicated dynamic equation set is established in terms of expense targets. Second, the equilibrium solutions of the equation set are obtained to test strategy options. The trends of system fluctuations caused by penalty and reward changes are also analyzed. Finally, the stability of the proposed model is improved by integrating a dynamic penalty–reward scenario into the evolutionary strategy of the PO. Simulation results show that: 1) the evolutionary stable strategy does not exist in initial interactions, 2) the degrees of penalty and reward considerably affect the CC’s rate variable, and 3) the dynamic penalty–reward scenario could effectively improve the stability of the proposed model. The unsteadiness of the quality supervision system and the stability control scenario could help in understanding the impact of interactions among stakeholders and provide suggestions for optimizing quality supervision procedures.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

System Dynamics Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory for Quality Supervision Among Construction Stakeholders

Guo

Zhang

Yang

2018

Journal of Civil Engineering and Management

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“…According to formulas (28) and (30), we can further obtain the dynamic replication equation of PS 1 and AS 2 :…”

Section: Evolutionary Game Solution Ofmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Optimization Management of Cloud Privacy Strategy Based on Evolution Game

Sun

2020

Security and Communication Networks

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Cloud computing services have great convenience, but privacy security is a big obstacle of popularity. In the process result of privacy protection of cloud computing, it is difficult to choose the optimal strategy. In order to solve this problem, we propose a quantitative weight model of privacy information, use evolutionary game theory to establish a game model of attack protection, design the optimal protection strategy selection algorithm, and make the evolutionary stable equilibrium solution method from the limited rational constraint. In order to study the strategic dependence of the same game group, the classical dynamic replication equation is improved by using the incentive coefficient, an improved evolutionary game model of attack protection is constructed, the stability of equilibrium point is further analyzed by Jacobian matrix method, and the optimal selection strategy is obtained under different conditions. Finally, the correctness and validity of the model are verified by experiments, different strategies of the same group have the dual effects of promotion and inhibition, and the advantages of this paper are shown by comparing with other articles.

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“…Some scholars have analyzed the acting mechanism of various policies including fiscal policies on environmental pollution control using evolutionary game method. For example, Duan et al (2016) established tripartite evolutionary game models of government-enterprise-social based on system dynamics. By changing the "Reward for no pollution discharge" and other government environmental regulation strategies, the actions and the data outputs were compared between the static punishment model and the dynamic punishment model [49].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Duan et al (2016) established tripartite evolutionary game models of government-enterprise-social based on system dynamics. By changing the "Reward for no pollution discharge" and other government environmental regulation strategies, the actions and the data outputs were compared between the static punishment model and the dynamic punishment model [49]. Xie et al (2018) constructed evolutionary game models involving the government and peasant under different subsidy strategies, as well as an evolutionary game model between the central and local government in the process of protecting cultivated land.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

2019

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To promote third-party environmental pollution control in China, it is necessary to dissect the mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. This study first discusses the acting paths of fiscal policies on third-party environmental pollution control in theory. A tripartite evolutionary game model involving the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise is established. The replicator dynamics, evolutionary stability strategies, and numerical simulation of the behavior of the three participants are analyzed to further study the acting mechanism of fiscal policy in third-party environmental pollution control. In addition, the influences of other parameters on the implementation of third-party environmental pollution control are evaluated. The results show that the behaviors of the local government, the polluting enterprise, and the third-party enterprise influence each other. Furthermore, strengthening the relevant fiscal policy, reducing the risks of the polluting enterprise and third-party enterprise, and improving the benefit to the local government are conducive to promoting third-party environmental pollution control in China. Based on these results, this study proposes the following policy implications: formulating fiscal policies for third-party environmental pollution control, implementing fiscal policies in a dynamic and progressive manner, improving the market mechanism of third-party environmental pollution control, and strengthening the environmental performance assessment of the local government.

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Game modeling and policy research on the system dynamics-based tripartite evolution for government environmental regulation

Cited by 48 publications

References 39 publications

System Dynamics Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory for Quality Supervision Among Construction Stakeholders

System Dynamics Model Based on Evolutionary Game Theory for Quality Supervision Among Construction Stakeholders

Research on the Optimization Management of Cloud Privacy Strategy Based on Evolution Game

Does Fiscal Policy Promote Third-Party Environmental Pollution Control in China? An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach

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