Game Models on Optimal Strategies in a Tourism Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Yang, Lei; Ji, Jingna; Chen, Kebing

doi:10.1155/2016/5760139

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…In terms of dual-channel pricing decisions based on the Bertrand game and the Stackelberg game, the article [50] analysed efficient pricing decisions by comparing dynamic and static dual-channel supply chain pricing models. These models are mostly based on the relevant factors that influence supply chain decisions such as price [51] and service [52].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Two-Stage Closed-Loop Supply Chain Pricing Decision: Cross-Channel Recycling and Channel Preference

Pan

Lin

2021

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This paper focuses on the pricing problem of a two-stage closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) considering the cross-channel recycling and channel preference based on a single manufacturer and a single traditional retailer. The pricing decision problem raises from the manufacturer’s direct sales and the retailer’s retailing including recycling. Managers need to focus on intelligible management considering consumer channel preferences, cross-channel recovery and pricing strategies. According to game theory, centralized and decentralized CLSC decision models are used to provide an efficient solution to managers for the pricing problem. The centralized model consists of differential and uniform pricing strategy and the decentralized model consists of manufacturer-led Stackelberg, retailer-led Stackelberg and Nash equilibrium game, respectively. The impact of cross-channel recycling rate and channel preference on pricing and profitability in a two-stage CLSC system is explained elaborately in this study. The results show that cross-channel recovery rates and consumer channel preferences have a direct significant impact on pricing strategies including profit allocation decisions in CLSC. It demonstrated that different channel preferences leading to different pricing strategies and decision for manufacturers and retailers choices. Manufacturer’s pricing decreases when channel preferences are constant and cross-channel recovery rates increase. Retailer’s pricing remains stable as the cross-channel recovery rate has less affected on it. Furthermore, if the cross-channel recovery rates increase, then the manufacturers pricing decreases and retailers pricing increases. This information will be a helpful guideline for the manager to select suitable pricing strategies based on the company scenario.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Two-Stage Closed-Loop Supply Chain Pricing Decision: Cross-Channel Recycling and Channel Preference

Pan

Lin

2021

Axioms

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“…ere are a large number of research studies on the traditional dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer has an online channel and the retailer has a physical store channel. ese research studies on the dualchannel supply chain focus on channel selection [13][14][15][16], channel coordination [13,[17][18][19][20], the pricing and other decisions optimization [21][22][23][24][25][26][27], and channel competition [28][29][30]. A comprehensive review of dual-channel supply chains can be found in Tsay and Agrawal [11] and Cai et al [12].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing Decisions of a Supply Chain with Multichannel Retailer under Fairness Concerns

Zhen

Shi

Tsai

et al. 2019

Mathematical Problems in Engineering

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With the rapid development of the Internet, many traditional retailers have built their online channels. The fairness concern may play an important role in a dual-channel supply chain with a multichannel retailer. This paper establishes a Stackelberg game model in which a manufacturer produces and sells products through direct online channel and a retailer sells directly to consumers through online and offline channels. The manufacturer’s fairness concern (advantageous inequity) and the retailer’s fairness concern (disadvantageous inequity) are considered. Four scenarios are investigated: no fairness concern (NF), the retailer fairness concern (RF), the manufacturer fairness concern (MF), and both the manufacturer and the retailer fairness concern (MRF). The theoretical analysis shows that if the manufacturer’s advantageous inequity concern is low, the profit of the whole supply chain in the MRF scenario is the greatest. Otherwise, the supply chain profit in the NF or RF scenario is the greatest. That is, the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s fairness concern may increase the profit of the supply chain. This study also finds that the manufacturer’s advantageous inequity concern can increase the social welfare. The retailer should not concern about fairness if the manufacturer has high fairness concern. Besides, this paper shows that the manufacturer’s selling price cannot be affected by the fairness concern. Adjusting the wholesale price is the only thing that the manufacturer can do to reduce disadvantageous or advantageous inequity. In the RF scenario, the role of the retailer’s disadvantageous inequity concern is to reallocate the supply chain profit. Our findings provide some managerial insights on the pricing decision when the multichannel retailer and the manufacturer consider the fairness.

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“…They find that the TOs would bid a lower wholesale room price to the hotel with higher capacity and vice versa. Yang et al (2016) discuss a two-echelon tourism supply chain consisting of a hotel and an online travel agency by comparing the sequential game with price competition. Long and Shi (2017) investigate the optimal pricing strategies of a tour operator and an online travel agency when they adopt the Online To Offline (O2O) model through the online sale and offline service cooperation.…”

Section: Pricing In the Tourism Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Sustainable tourism modeling: Pricing decisions and evolutionarily stable strategies for competitive tour operators

et al. 2018

Tourism Economics

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In this article, we investigate two competitive tour operators (TOs) who choose between traditional tourism strategy (strategy T) and green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). Our article attempts to address the following important issues using evolutionary game models: when would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can the government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when the environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival’s decisions, but the opposite is true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to be more effective, the government first offer the green subsidy to highly competitive tourism locations and/or more innovative TOs.

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Game Models on Optimal Strategies in a Tourism Dual-Channel Supply Chain

Cited by 9 publications

References 37 publications

A Two-Stage Closed-Loop Supply Chain Pricing Decision: Cross-Channel Recycling and Channel Preference

A Two-Stage Closed-Loop Supply Chain Pricing Decision: Cross-Channel Recycling and Channel Preference

Pricing Decisions of a Supply Chain with Multichannel Retailer under Fairness Concerns

Sustainable tourism modeling: Pricing decisions and evolutionarily stable strategies for competitive tour operators

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