Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation Among Supply Chain Agents: Review and Extensions

Nagarajan, Mahesh; Sošić, Greys

doi:10.2139/ssrn.900744

Cited by 88 publications

(100 citation statements)

References 82 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Concretely, in buyback policy 2, the unit wholesale price w and buyback prices, b and , r b between a manufacturer and a retailer are coordinated as the Nash bargaining solutions (Nagarajan and Sosic, 2008;Du et al, 2011). The coordinated prices…”

Section: Supply Chain Coordination In Sc Under E-commercementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this case, it is the absolute requirement for all members under the integrated supply chain to obtain the more expected profits than those under the decentralized supply chain. In order to achieve the increases in profits of all members under the integrated supply chain, a variety of supply chain coordination approaches between all members have been discussed by Cachon and Netessine (2004), Chauhan and Proth (2005), Nagarajan and Sosic (2008), Du et al (2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Impact of Information Sharing Regarding Customer Returns Ratio on Optimal Sales Strategy under E-commerce

Saito¹,

Kusukawa²

2015

Industrial Engineering and Management Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A correct information of customer returns ratio under e-commerce is not always shared between supply chain (SC) members. Also, it is important issue for SC members to handle the unsold products in a market. This paper discusses the impact of information sharing of customer returns ratio on an optimal sales strategy including resale of customer returns and buyback policy for a SC under e-commerce with a manufacturer and a retailer. A retailer sells a single product and resells the resalable customer returns in the same market. A manufacturer produces the products and buys back the unsold products as to their quality from the retailer. The integrated SC (ISC) determines the optimal product order quantity to maximize the expected profit of the whole SC. The decentralized SC (DSC) makes the optimal decisions for order quantity and the wholesale price of products to maximize the expected profit of each SC member. The effect of information sharing is discussed between SC members under ISC and DSC. The analysis numerically investigates how information sharing of the returns ratio affects the optimal decision and the expected profits under ISC and DSC. Besides, effect of SC coordination to encourage the shift to ISC is discussed.

show abstract

Section: Supply Chain Coordination In Sc Under E-commercementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of Information Sharing Regarding Customer Returns Ratio on Optimal Sales Strategy under E-commerce

Saito¹,

Kusukawa²

2015

Industrial Engineering and Management Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Since von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), game theory has been employed in numerous attempts to understand human and institutional interactions across a range of contexts that includes policy studies, international relations (Allison, 1969), business strategy (takeover behaviour, monopolies) (Rasmusen, 1999), including most recently attempts to understand the supply chain relationships (Nagarajan and Sošić, 2008) and contributions in economics to explain market formation, functioning and price setting and importantly, where strategies have to be set in relation to government policy activities (Watkins, 2003). Attention has also been given over a long period to general problems of collective action (see for example Hume (1739) and Rousseau (1977) on the stag hunt game) in which multiple actors may choose to collaborate for potentially shared benefits.…”

Section: Implicating Game Theory?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of Information? A Game Theoretic Contribution to Understanding the Development of an Indicators Policy for the UK Construction Industry

Rigby

Dewick

Courtney³

et al. 2011

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractIn the UK over the last decade, benchmarking has been consistently promoted as a solution to the problems of industry and the construction industry in particular. Government support of benchmarking in construction through the development of a key performance indicators programme found justification in the public goods aspects of the innovation process and because of the presence of market failures of information facing construction clients. However, attempts to merge benchmarking approaches into a single framework did not lead to a combined programme as intended. A game theoretic analysis of the implementation of government policy is presented to account for difficulties encountered by policy actors and to explain why a suitable mechanism to facilitate mutual benchmarking could not be devised. A key performance indicator (KPI) system that supports clients and suppliers in any sectorhere we consider construction -is highly problematic, not only because the types of information and types of processes that generate the information used by clients and suppliers are generally different, but because the exchange of information between 4 suppliers and clients and vice versa potentially leads to loss of commercially valuable information.

show abstract

“…Using the mean-variance analysis for each risk attitude, the theoretically optimal decisions for product order quantity, collection incentive, and lower limit of quality level, in the decentralized GSC (DGSC) and the integrated GSC (IGSC) are made. DGSC optimizes the utility function of each member, based on the Stackelberg game (Nagarajan and Sosic, 2008;Yan and Sun, 2012, Watanabe et al, 2013, Watanabe and Kusukawa, 2014, Hong et al, 2015. IGSC optimizes that of the whole system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, supply chain coordination is introduced into IGSC to encourage both members to shift the optimal operations as to risk attitude of GSC members from those in DGSC, by guaranteeing the both members' expected profits improvement in IGSC. Concretely, the unit wholesale price and compensation for collection incentive of used products are coordinated between members as to risk attitudes in IGSC as Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950(Nash, , 1953Kohli Park, 1989, Nagarajan andSosic, 2008;Hong et al, 2013;Watanabe et al, 2013;Watanabe and Kusukawa, 2014;Ghosh and Shah, 2015).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mean-Variance Analysis for Optimal Operation and Supply Chain Coordination in a Green Supply Chain

Yamaguchi¹,

Goto²,

Kusukawa³

2017

Industrial Engineering and Management Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

It is urgently-needed to construct a green supply chain (GSC) from collection of used products through recycling of them to sales of products using the recycled parts. Besides, it is necessary to consider the uncertainty in product demand as a risk in a GSC. This study proposes the optimal operations for a GSC with a retailer and a manufacturer. A retailer pays an incentive for collection of used products from customers and sells a single type of products in a market. A manufacturer produces the products ordered by the retailer, using recyclable parts with acceptable quality and compensates the collection cost of used products as to the recycled parts. This paper discusses the following risk attitudes: risk-neutral attitude, risk-averse attitude, and risk-prone attitude. Using mean-variance analysis, the optimal decisions for product order quantity, collection incentive, and lower limit of quality level, in the decentralized GSC (DGSC) and the integrated GSC (IGSC) are made. DGSC optimizes the utility function of each member. IGSC does that of the whole system. The analysis numerically investigates how (i) risk attitude and (ii) quality of recyclable parts affect the optimal operations. Supply chain coordination between GSC members to shift IGSC from DGSC is discussed.

show abstract

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation Among Supply Chain Agents: Review and Extensions

Cited by 88 publications

References 82 publications

Impact of Information Sharing Regarding Customer Returns Ratio on Optimal Sales Strategy under E-commerce

Impact of Information Sharing Regarding Customer Returns Ratio on Optimal Sales Strategy under E-commerce

The Limits of Information? A Game Theoretic Contribution to Understanding the Development of an Indicators Policy for the UK Construction Industry

Mean-Variance Analysis for Optimal Operation and Supply Chain Coordination in a Green Supply Chain

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About