Game Theoretic Research on the Design of International Environmental Agreements: Insights, Critical Remarks, and Future Challenges

Finus, Michael

doi:10.1561/101.00000011

Cited by 187 publications

(118 citation statements)

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“…Otherwise, it enters as another obstacle for countries to support a greater degree of international environmental cooperation. These results 7 See also the following more recent reviews of the literature: Barrett (2005) and Finus (2008). 8 Much of the literature on IEAs examines the case of symmetric countries.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Economic Targets and Loss‐Aversion in International Environmental Cooperation

İriş

2017

Environmental Economics and Sustainability

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In the standard emission problem, each country's ruling party decides on an optimal level of emissions by analyzing the cost and benefit to the country. However, such policy decisions are often influenced by political parties' incentives to be elected. Voters tend to give higher priority to economic issues than they do to environmental ones. As a result, political parties have additional incentives to reach a critical economic benefit level, at a cost of higher emission level, in order to satisfy voters' expectations in economic issues. Therefore, this study explores the implications of political parties being averse to insufficient economic performance relative to a critical economic target level on sustaining an international environmental agreement on emission levels. In doing so, we allow countries to have asymmetric concerns about economic targets, as well as asymmetric technology levels. We find that stronger concerns about economic targets deter the most cooperative emission levels countries could jointly sustain. Furthermore, technological asymmetry could either deepen or offset this impact. These results suggest that efforts on achieving substantial international environmental agreements should be supported at the citizen level to eliminate the adverse effects.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 90%

Economic Targets and Loss‐Aversion in International Environmental Cooperation

İriş

2017

Environmental Economics and Sustainability

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“…These two assumptions are arguably strong. There is actually a significant game-theoretic literature which precisely seeks to inject non-cooperative ingredients into the analysis of international agreements (see Finus (2008) for a recent survey of the literature).…”

Section: Technology Transfer With Environmental Cooperationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Incentives to North-South Transfer of Climate-Mitigation Technologies with Trade in Polluting Goods

2016

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe need to transfer climate mitigation technologies towards the developing world has been acknowledged since the beginning of climate negotiations. Little progress has however been made as shown by Article 10 of the Paris Agreement. One reason is that these technologies could become vital assets to compete on global markets. This paper presents a partial equilibrium model with two regions, the North and the South, and imperfect competition in the international polluting goods market to analyze the North's incentives to accept technology transfer. Results crucially depend on the existence of environmental cooperation. When both northern and southern governments set emission quotas non-cooperatively, inducing fewer global emissions is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the North to accept the transfer. In contrast, when governments set quotas cooperatively, the North never accepts the transfer because it only leads to a partial relocation of pollutant goods production to the South. We derive the implications for the global regulation of climate change.JEL codes: D43; F18; Q5.

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“…Game theory provides useful theoretical insights into how commons governance might be designed to encourage cooperation and discourage the kind of behavior that leads to resource degradation (8,9). Game theory applied to the design of international environmental agreements can help to find strategies that promotes participation and abatement by most, if not all, emitters (10,11). If we assume that each nation will act rationally in its own self-interest, then the path to reducing climate risk is to design a set of rules for emissions to which countries will agree, because they find it beneficial.…”

Section: The Game Of Climate Policymentioning

confidence: 99%