Game-Theoretic Security for Bit Commitment

Higo, Haruna; Tanaka, Keisuke; Yasunaga, Kenji

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-41383-4_20

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Much study has been devoted to rational secret sharing [20,1,14,24,25,27,28,3]. There are studies on other cryptographic primitives such as fair two-party computation [2,16], leader election [15], byzantine agreement [17], oblivious transfer [21], and commitment schemes [22]. Our work also can be seen as a study of rational cryptography.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public-Key Encryption with Lazy Parties

Yasunaga

2016

IEICE Trans. Fundamentals

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In a public-key encryption scheme, if a sender is not concerned about the security of a message and is unwilling to generate costly randomness, the security of the encrypted message can be compromised. In this work, we characterize such lazy parties, who are regraded as honest parties, but are unwilling to perform a costly task when they are not concerned about the security. Specifically, we consider a rather simple setting in which the costly task is to generate randomness used in algorithms, and parties can choose either perfect randomness or a fixed string. We model lazy parties as rational players who behave rationally to maximize their utilities, and define a security game between the parties and an adversary. Since a standard secure encryption scheme does not work in the setting, we provide constructions of secure encryption schemes in various settings.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public-Key Encryption with Lazy Parties

Yasunaga

2016

IEICE Trans. Fundamentals

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“…In addition, as in the work of [4,14,15], we consider Nash equilibrium as the solution concept in terms of the game theory.…”

Section: Analysis Of Game-theoretic Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, Asharov et al [4] studied two-party protocols in the fail-stop model in terms of game-theoretic security and showed how the notion of game theory can capture cryptographic properties. Furthermore, the game-theoretic security for oblivious transfer [14] and bit commitment [15] has been studied in the malicious model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Compiler of Two-Party Protocols for Composable and Game-Theoretic Security, and Its Application to Oblivious Transfer

Goto

Shikata

2015

Cryptography and Coding

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In this paper, we consider the following question: Does composing protocols having gametheoretic security result in a secure protocol in the sense of game-theoretic security? In order to discuss the composability of game-theoretic properties, we study security of cryptographic protocols in terms of the universal composability (UC) and game theory simultaneously. The contribution of this paper is the following: (i) We propose a compiler of two-party protocols in the local universal composability (LUC) framework such that it transforms any two-party protocol secure against semi-honest adversaries into a protocol secure against malicious adversaries in the LUC framework; (ii) We consider the application of our compiler to oblivious transfer (OT) protocols, by which we obtain a construction of OT meeting both UC security and game-theoreticsecurity.

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Game-Theoretic Security of Commitment Protocols under a Realistic Cost Model

Komatsubara

Manabe

2016

2016 IEEE 30th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA)

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Game-Theoretic Security for Bit Commitment

Cited by 3 publications

References 14 publications

Public-Key Encryption with Lazy Parties

Public-Key Encryption with Lazy Parties

A Compiler of Two-Party Protocols for Composable and Game-Theoretic Security, and Its Application to Oblivious Transfer

Game-Theoretic Security of Commitment Protocols under a Realistic Cost Model

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