Game Theory for Applied Economists

Gibbons, Robert D.

doi:10.2307/j.ctvcmxrzd

Cited by 755 publications

(506 citation statements)

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“…The Stackelberg duopoly is a dynamic model of duopoly in which one firm, say firm A, moves first and the other firm, say B, goes after. Firm A is usually called the leader and firm B is the follower, and therefore the model of duopoly is also called the leader-follower model [45]. Before making its own decision, firm B observes the opponent' s move.…”

Section: Quantum Stackelberg Duopolymentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum Games under Decoherence

Huang

Qiu

2015

Int J Theor Phys

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Quantum systems are easily influenced by ambient environments. Decoherence is generated by system interaction with external environment. In this paper, we analyse the effects of decoherence on quantum games with Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) (Eisert et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 83(15), 3077 1999) and Marinatto-Weber (MW) (Marinatto and Weber, Phys. Lett. A 272, 291 2000) schemes. Firstly, referring to the analytical approach that was introduced by Eisert et al. (Phys. Rev. Lett. 83(15), 3077 1999), we analyse the effects of decoherence on quantum Chicken game by considering different traditional noisy channels. We investigate the Nash equilibria and changes of payoff in specific two-parameter strategy set for maximally entangled initial states. We find that the Nash equilibria are different in different noisy channels. Since Unruh effect produces a decoherence-like effect and can be perceived as a quantum noise channel (Omkar et al., arXiv:1408.1477v1), with the same two parameter strategy set, we investigate the influences of decoherence generated by the Unruh effect on three-player quantum Prisoners' Dilemma, the non-zero sum symmetric multiplayer quantum game both for unentangled and entangled initial states. We discuss the effect of the acceleration of noninertial frames on the the game's properties such as payoffs, symmetry, Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimal, dominant strategy, etc. Finally, we study the decoherent influences of correlated noise and Unruh effect on quantum Stackelberg duopoly for entangled and unentangled initial states with the depolarizing channel. Our investigations show that under the influence of correlated depolarizing channel and acceleration in noninertial frame, some critical points exist for an unentangled initial state at which firms get equal payoffs and the game becomes a follower advantage game. Int J Theor PhysIt is shown that the game is always a leader advantage game for a maximally entangled initial state and there appear some points at which the payoffs become zero.

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Section: Quantum Stackelberg Duopolymentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantum Games under Decoherence

Huang

Qiu

2015

Int J Theor Phys

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“…9 We have confined our attention to pure-strategy product-line equilibria. However, as correctly pointed out by Reviewer 1, our simultaneous product-line game has the flavor of the Battle of the Sexes game (Gibbons 1992, Chapter 1), which suggests that a mixed-strategy product-line equilibrium likely exists. 10 Let α i (i = 1, 2) denote the size of firm i's loyal segment.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 85%

Product line competition and price promotions

Jing

Zhang

2011

Quant Mark Econ

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“…However, it may be difficult for a third party (such as court) to enforce the contract, perhaps because the appropriate measures of output include the quality of output, unexpected difficulties in the conditions of production, and so on [42]. Therefore, in some scenarios, the ex ante reward mechanism could be more suitable than the ex post reward mechanism.…”

Section: Ex Ante Reward Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 98%

Reward mechanisms for P2P VoIP networks

Jhang-Li

Cheng

2010

Inf Technol Manag

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As we have seen, P2P VoIP software, such as Skype, has emerged from the current generation of telecommunication systems. However, establishing communication applications based on P2P networks without considering the operational models of the Internet presents potential dangers. In this study, we treat a VoIP telephone conversation as a dynamic game and compare the ex post reward mechanism with the ex ante reward mechanism in forward versus discard and QoS routing. Our simulation results point out that the ex post reward mechanism is better than the ex ante reward mechanism in forward versus discard; however, the opposite holds true in QoS routing when the expected number of periods is sufficiently large. In addition, this study considers the reward mechanisms and the platform provider's benefit to find the optimal number of supernodes in a transmission path.

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Game Theory for Applied Economists

Cited by 755 publications

References 0 publications

Quantum Games under Decoherence

Quantum Games under Decoherence

Product line competition and price promotions

Reward mechanisms for P2P VoIP networks

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