Games for exchanging information

Kol, Gillat; Naor, Moni

doi:10.1145/1374376.1374437

Cited by 93 publications

(195 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…This is quite similar to what was proven in Kol and Naor's paper [7] for Theorem 5.2. However, in our case, we are using an asynchronous channel instead of the simultaneous channel that they used.…”

Section: Protocol Analysissupporting

confidence: 91%

“…The values of β 0 and c 0 : We now need to calculate two values before we proceed to formulate our theorem. This analysis is present in Kol and Naor's paper [7] and will be repeated below (with slight tweaks) for the sake of understanding. We first define the utility values for a player i as follows:…”

Section: Protocol Analysismentioning

confidence: 95%

“…In stage 1, we broadcast player i's share of R j ⊗ S j where R j is a random number used in game j and S j is the possible secret used in game j. We also broadcast information theoretic authentication information about the stage 1 information as done in [7]. In stage 2, we broadcast player i's share of R j as well as i's share of a boolean indicator, which indicates whether the current game is the true game or not.…”

Section: Our Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…-Authentication Information: Information theoretic security checking as done in [7]. A "tag" to prove the authenticity of the masked secret and "hash values" to check the authenticity of other players' tags.…”

Section: Our Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several protocols have been devised to solve this problem [5,4,1,10,9,8,7,6,11,13,2,3], but only a handful have actually dealt with rational secret sharing using an asynchronous broadcast channel. These include Maleka et al's result [10] and Fuchsbauer et al's result [3], and Ong et al's result [13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rational Secret Sharing with Honest Players over an Asynchronous Channel

Moses

Rangan

2011

Advances in Network Security and Applications

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We consider the problem of rational secret sharing introduced by Halpern and Teague [5], where the players involved in secret sharing play only if it is to their advantage. This can be characterized in the form of preferences. Players would prefer to get the secret than to not get it and secondly with lesser preference, they would like as few other players to get the secret as possible. Several positive results have already been published to efficiently solve the problem of rational secret sharing. However, only a handful of papers have touched upon the use of an asynchronous broadcast channel, and in those papers, either the protocol involved cryptographic primitives [3] or else the protocol required the dealer to be interactively involved [10]. However, [13] did handle such a case through the use of an honest minority of players, but in their paper, they had placed a restriction on the number of honest players that could take part in relation to the total number number of players active in the protocol.In our paper, we propose an m-out-of-n rational secret sharing scheme which can function over an asynchronous broadcast channel without the use of cryptographic primitives and with a non-interactive dealer. This is possible because our scheme uses a small number, k + 1, of honest players. The protocol is resilient to coalitions of size up to k and furthermore it is ε-resilient to coalitions of size up to m − 1. The protocol will have a strict Nash equilibrium with probability P r( k+1 n ) and an ε-Nash equilibrium with probability P r( n−k−1 n ). Furthermore, our protocol is immune to backward induction.Later on in the paper, we extend our results to include malicious players as well. We also show that our protocol handles the possibility of a player deviating in order to force another player to get a wrong value. This type of deviation was discussed and handled by Asharov and Lindell [2] by increasing the number of rounds. However, our protocol handles this in what we believe to be a more time efficient manner.

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Section: Protocol Analysissupporting

confidence: 91%

Section: Protocol Analysismentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Our Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Our Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rational Secret Sharing with Honest Players over an Asynchronous Channel

Moses

Rangan

2011

Advances in Network Security and Applications

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Social rational secure multi‐party computation

Wang

Liu

Wang

et al. 2013

Concurrency and Computation

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SUMMARYRational party is a new kind of parties who behave neither like honest parties nor like malicious adversaries. The crux point of rational party is the definition of the utility function, as rational parties only care about how to maximize their utility. In other words, rational parties choose the strategies, which can bring them the highest utilities. In rational secure two‐party computation protocol, the main task is how to boost mutual cooperation to complete the protocol. Social rational secure multi‐party computation (SRSMPC) means that in a social network, some distributed and rational parties with reputation properties want to jointly compute a functionality. The seemingly simple task becomes tough under three conditions. The first condition is that the network composed by parties may not be complete. That is, two parties may not be neighbors and they are connected through other parties. The second is that the network may be not secure. That is, messages may be tempered by malicious parties. The third condition is that parties may run the protocol under incomplete information scenario. That is, parties may have types and each type has a corresponding utility function. Under the first and second conditions, parties need to consider how to securely transmit messages between two parties who are not neighbors. Under the third condition, we propose the Tit‐for‐Tat strategy and prove that mutual cooperation is a sequential equilibrium between two parties. In this paper, we construct an SRSMPC protocol by using mechanism design under incomplete information to facilitate the implementation of the SRSMPC protocol within constant rounds. Meanwhile, newcomers are allowed to participate in the protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first social rational secure computation protocol for multi‐party under an incomplete information scenario and an incomplete network. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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New rational parties relying on reputation

Wang

Liu

2013

Security Comm. Networks

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In this paper, we redefine the utilities considering other parts such as reputation in order to give rational parties incentives to participate in the protocol and finally get the correct outputs. The most distinct contribution of this paper is the proposal of rational covert adversaries whose behaviors are combinations of rational parties and covert adversaries. Finally, given proper parameters, we prove that all parties have incentives to participate in the rational secure computation protocol.

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Games for exchanging information

Cited by 93 publications

References 15 publications

Rational Secret Sharing with Honest Players over an Asynchronous Channel

Rational Secret Sharing with Honest Players over an Asynchronous Channel

Social rational secure multi‐party computation

New rational parties relying on reputation

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