Games for triggering collective change in natural resource management: A conceptual framework and insights from four cases from India

Falk, Thomas; Zhang, Wei; Meinzen-Dick, Ruth Suseela; Bartels, Lara

doi:10.2499/p15738coll2.134238

Cited by 7 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 94 publications

(148 reference statements)

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“…For example, in the Pangani Basin, water authorities assisted by putting oral river sharing arrangements on paper (Komakech 2013). Networks of researchers and support agencies can assist communities in managing their commons, especially in unknown areas such as rapidly expanding groundwater development (Meinzen-Dick et al 2020;Falk et al 2021).…”

Section: Mediating In Customary Sharing In and Out Of Water Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Living customary water tenure in rights-based water management in Sub-Saharan Africa

Koppen¹

2022

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Barbara van Koppen1 This study uses the term 'water tenure' as the term 'law' may be misinterpreted and be confined to only state law. 2 These terms are used interchangeably to indicate the empirical, existing 'living' realities as assessed by researchers. 'Local' or 'informal' conveys the dynamic nature largely outside the ambit of the state while 'customary' better conveys the history and social embeddedness of the rules and norms. This report avoids legal constructs of customary law as interpreted by colonial lawyers, judges and experts, often to legitimize resource grabbing (Hellum et al. 2015).

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Section: Mediating In Customary Sharing In and Out Of Water Resourcesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Living customary water tenure in rights-based water management in Sub-Saharan Africa

Koppen¹

2022

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“…As Narloch et al (2012) note, the possibility to internally discuss collective strategies following the recommendations of an external agent can be a simple means to increase cooperation (Moreno-Sanchez and Maldonado, 2010), though the effectiveness of such internal mechanisms depends on group contexts (Cardenas 2003 and other factors such as social norms that also govern behavior and rule compliance as reported in Janssen et al (2013). Focusing on the social learning role of games, Falk et al (2021) emphasize that games are designed in a way that players have a chance to jointly invent, negotiate, and experiment with rule-making (Woodhill 2010, Hertzog et al 2014, Speelman et al 2017. From the perspective of effectiveness of social learning (Falk et al 2021), internally determined institutional arrangement can help strengthen participants' confidence in the institutions as well as own capacity, willingness and feeling of responsibility to invest in the provision of institutional services (Pahl-Wostl et al 2007, Wigboldus et al 2016.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Focusing on the social learning role of games, Falk et al (2021) emphasize that games are designed in a way that players have a chance to jointly invent, negotiate, and experiment with rule-making (Woodhill 2010, Hertzog et al 2014, Speelman et al 2017. From the perspective of effectiveness of social learning (Falk et al 2021), internally determined institutional arrangement can help strengthen participants' confidence in the institutions as well as own capacity, willingness and feeling of responsibility to invest in the provision of institutional services (Pahl-Wostl et al 2007, Wigboldus et al 2016.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, if the monetary reward is perceived as very low, this can backfire and participants will put in less effort (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000). Some experimentalistsmainly in psychology -argue that intrinsic motivations are strong enough to reveal people's behavioral patterns (Smith and Walker 1993, Bartels et al 2022, Falk et al 2021) and it could be more effective to appeal to moral incentives (such as contributing to an important activity) rather than providing a monetary reward (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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How Do Game Design, Gender, and Players’ Backgrounds Affect Behavior in Framed Field Experiments? Evidence from Community Forestry in India

et al. 2022

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Framed field experiments (experimental games) are widely used to assess factors affecting cooperation in management of the commons. However, there is relatively little attention to how details of the games affect experimental results. This paper presents qualitative and quantitative results from a framed field experiment in which participants make decisions about extraction of a common-pool resource, a community forest. The experiment was conducted in 2017-2018 with 120 groups of resource users (split by gender) from 60 habitations in two Indian states, Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan. We test whether within-subject treatments (non-communication, communication, and optional election of institutional arrangements (rules)), remuneration methods, and design of the game board affect harvest behavior and groups' tendency to cooperate. We also examine how characteristics of the community and players affect players' choices in the game, with special attention to gender differences. Results reveal participants harvested substantially less than the Nash prediction even in the absence of communication, with men extracting less than women in both states. For male groups in both states, both communication and optional rule election were associated with lower group harvest per round, as compared to the reference non-communication game. For female groups in both states communication itself did not significantly slow resource depletion; but introduction of optional rule election did reduce harvest amounts. For both men and women in Andhra Pradesh and men in Rajasthan, incentivized payments to individual participants significantly lowered group harvest, relative to community flat payment, suggesting such payments stimulated deliberation among game players. Findings have methodological and practical implications for designing behavioral intervention programs to improve common-pool resource governance.

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“…andOrtiz-Riomalo et al (2020) describe each participatory process and method in more detail. For the (potential) impacts of serious games in natural resource management, seeMedema et al (2016),Meinzen- Dick et al (2018),Falk et al (2021) andMeyer et al (2021). 11 In each game, participants' decisions had financial implications.…”

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confidence: 99%

Participatory interventions for collective action and sustainable resource management: linking actors, situations and contexts through the IAD, NAS and SES frameworks

et al. 2022

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Overcoming complex environmental challenges demands different forms of stakeholder participation and collective action. While informative and relevant for participatory interventions, the literatures on collective action and participatory governance have largely remained disconnected. We illustrate how the institutional analysis and development (IAD), network of (adjacent) action situation (NAS) and social–ecological system (SES) frameworks can be combined to provide a coherent approach that integrates these literatures, applies their insights and bridges this disconnect. We compare two similar participatory interventions, one in Colombia and one in Peru, whose design and implementation we supported. Transdisciplinary in nature, both sought to foster collective action for watershed management. The frameworks allow us to demarcate, characterise and reflect upon the action situations (ASs) for the collective choice, coordination and knowledge generation that constituted each participatory intervention (i.e. the constituent NAS) and other relevant operational and institutional ASs that lay outside the boundaries of the participatory interventions. These other ASs may not be linked to one another or to the intervention’s constituent NAS, but they influence the outcomes of interest nevertheless, thereby shaping the potential of the participatory interventions for collective action and sustainable natural resource management. The framework then suggests, and our comparative analysis illustrates, that organisers and researchers of participatory interventions, such as multi-actor deliberative platforms and transdisciplinary research projects, should carefully consider, reflect upon and address the constellation of relevant actors, ASs and contexts co-determining the outcomes of interest. Our study demonstrates how the IAD, SES and NAS frameworks can support that endeavour.

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Games for triggering collective change in natural resource management: A conceptual framework and insights from four cases from India

Cited by 7 publications

References 94 publications

Living customary water tenure in rights-based water management in Sub-Saharan Africa

Living customary water tenure in rights-based water management in Sub-Saharan Africa

How Do Game Design, Gender, and Players’ Backgrounds Affect Behavior in Framed Field Experiments? Evidence from Community Forestry in India

Participatory interventions for collective action and sustainable resource management: linking actors, situations and contexts through the IAD, NAS and SES frameworks

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