Games of Fair Division

Tadenuma, Koichi; Thomson, William

doi:10.1006/game.1995.1015

Cited by 65 publications

(46 citation statements)

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“…The game v pre makes sure that when the players in S coalesce before the cake is cut, they maintain the same advantage over the players outside S, illustrated by (13), that they would get if they coalesced after the division. The games v and v pre differ in the system of weights contrasting the players in S to those outside S. Some features of v pre , however, are inherited from those of v with little effort.…”

Section: Cooperation After the Division Versus Cooperation Before Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in dividing the cake

Dall’Aglio

Brânzei

Tijs

2009

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This paper defines models of cooperation among players partitioning a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players' ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of the coalition. A social welfare function which takes into account coalitions drives the division. In addition, we derive a cooperative game which measures the performance of each coalition. This game is compared with the game in which players start cooperating only after the good has been portioned and has been allocated among the players. We show that a modified version of the game played before the division outperforms the game played after the division.

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Section: Cooperation After the Division Versus Cooperation Before Thementioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in dividing the cake

Dall’Aglio

Brânzei

Tijs

2009

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“…All these actions deal with the revelation of the personal preferences by the players. Truthfulness is not usually guaranteed in many procedures, and the attention of some authors has been focused on designing strategy-proof procedures that encourage players in revealing their true preferences, or, conversely, on showing the impossibility of this effort (see Tadenuma and Thomson (1995), Brams and Taylor (1996)). …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in Dividing the Cake

2008

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Cooperation in Dividing the CakeDall'Aglio, M.; Branzei, M.R.; Tijs, S.H. Publication date: 2008 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA):Dall'Aglio, M., Brânzei, R., & Tijs, S. H. (2008). Cooperation in Dividing the Cake. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-101). Tilburg: Operations research. General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research -You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain -You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. AbstractThis paper defines models of cooperation among players partitioning a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players' ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of the coalition. A social welfare function which takes into account coalitions drives the division. In addition, we derive a cooperative game which measures the performance of each coalition. This game is compared with the game in which players start cooperating only after the good has been portioned and has been allocated among the players. We show that a modified version of the game played before the division outperforms the game played after the division.

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“…Strategy-proofness has been investigated earlier by, e.g., Sönmez (1999,2003), Ehlers (2002), Pápai (2000) and Svensson (1999), when no monetary transfers are allowed, and by, e.g., Demange and Gale (1985) and Tadenuma and Thomson (1995), when monetary transfers are allowed, but when no exogenous restrictions are imposed on the monetary compensations. In recent papers by Anderson and Svensson (2006), Sun and Yang (2003) and Svensson (2006), an allocation problem, where the monetary transfers are restricted by an upper compensation limit is analyzed.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness

Andersson

Svensson

2007

Rev. Econ. Design

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This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and when only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair allocation not generally is guaranteed due the the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. We define an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrate that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, it is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation.JEL Classification: C71; C78; D63; D71; D78.

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Games of Fair Division

Cited by 65 publications

References 0 publications

Cooperation in dividing the cake

Cooperation in dividing the cake

Cooperation in Dividing the Cake

Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness

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