Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox

Rosenthal, Robert W.

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1

Cited by 628 publications

(331 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Consider the centipede game CP K (Þrst introduced by Rosenthal 1982) and depicted in Figure 1. the Þrst node (in period 26 We implicitly assume in the following that the players label these actions the same way.…”

Section: Centipede Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Comment 1: The two outcomes mentioned in Proposition 3 remain equilibrium outcomes even if player 1 uses a partitioning other than the coarsest, as long as player 2 uses the coarsest partitioning. 27 Comment 2: Consider the case where player 2 uses the coarsest partitioning and player 1 uses the Þnest partitioning (and condition (4) holds). As mentioned in Comment 1, Take by player 1 in the last node can be sustained as the equilibrium outcome of an analogy-based expectation equilibrium.…”

Section: Centipede Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

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Analogy-based expectation equilibrium

Jéhiel

2005

Journal of Economic Theory

332

216

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It is assumed that players bundle nodes in which other players must move into analogy classes, and players only have expectations about the average behavior in every class. A solution concept is proposed for multi-stage games with perfect information: at every node players choose best-responses to their analogy-based expectations, and expectations are correct on average over those various nodes pooled together into the same analogy classes. The approach is applied to a variety of games. It is shown that a player may beneÞt from having a coarse analogy partitioning. And for simple analogy partitioning,(1) initial cooperation followed by an end opportunistic behavior may emerge in the Þnitely repeated prisoner's dilemma (or in the centipede game), (2) an agreement need not be reached immediately in bargaining games with complete information.

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Section: Centipede Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Centipede Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Analogy-based expectation equilibrium

Jéhiel

2005

Journal of Economic Theory

332

216

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“…The centipede game, first introduced by Rosenthal (1982), is one of the most celebrated examples of the paradox of backward induction. In the two-player version of this game, players alternately choose either "Take (T)" or "Pass (P)" at each decision node.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Level-K Analysis of Experimental Centipede Games

Kawagoe

Takizawa

2008

SSRN Journal

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The centipede game is one of the most celebrated examples of the paradox of Focusing on the initial responses, this paper attempts to offer another explanation for the observed deviations by using level-k analysis, a non-equilibrium model of strategic thinking. We show that level-k analysis gives consistently good predictions for the experimental centipede games. The results suggest that experimental results of centipede games be explained without resorting to fairness concern or altruism.

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“…Note that this is a version of Rosenthal's [24] "centipede game" and what Reny calls the "take-it-or-leave-it game. "…”

Section: Backward Inductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior

Gül

1996

Journal of Economic Theory

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A non-equilibrium model of rational strategic behavior that can be viewed as a refinement of (normal form) rationalizability is developed for both normal form and extensive form games. This solution concept is called a τ -theory and is used to analyze the main concerns of the Nash equilibrium refinements literature such as dominance, iterative dominance, extensive form rationality, invariance, and backward induction. The relationship between τ -theories and dynamic learning is investigated.JEL classification number C72

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Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox

Cited by 628 publications

References 4 publications

Analogy-based expectation equilibrium

Analogy-based expectation equilibrium

Level-K Analysis of Experimental Centipede Games

Rationality and Coherent Theories of Strategic Behavior

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