Abstract:This paper examines a particular performance management instrument in Norway: DRGs used in conjunction with activity‐based funding of hospitals. We ask whether this system creates opportunities for undesirable gaming practices, how accountability arrangements deal with gaming, and how trust and institutional logic may help to explain anomalies and their resolve. From an instrumental and cultural perspective, we examine six Norwegian cases of gaming and two governmental assessments of coding and activity‐based … Show more
“…Based on this logic, we posit that: Hypothesis 1 : Citizens will regard performance management mechanisms as having a direct effect on their lives when they see organizational indicators rather than systemic indicators.A similar rationale applies when we consider the reliability citizens assign to performance information. The scholarly literature shows that people involved in performance management often distort measures and ‘game’ the system in ways that may produce misleading information (Heinrich and Marschke ; Lægreid and Neby ). Indeed, the stories that people may hear about or experience with regard to these strategies may lead them to view these indicators as unreliable.…”
Section: Citizens' Interpretations Of Performance Information: Impactmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A similar rationale applies when we consider the reliability citizens assign to performance information. The scholarly literature shows that people involved in performance management often distort measures and 'game' the system in ways that may produce misleading information (Heinrich and Marschke 2010;Laegreid and Neby 2016). Indeed, the stories that people may hear about or experience with regard to these strategies may lead them to view these indicators as unreliable.…”
Section: Citizens' Interpretations Of Performance Information: Impamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, the measures that the government publishes are supposed to inform the public about the performance of public organizations. Citizens can use this information to monitor public officials-both elected and appointed-thus strengthening public accountability (Thomas 2013;Barrows et al 2016;Laegreid and Neby 2016), make decisions that can ultimately improve their lives either through voice or exit, and make knowledgeable voting choices (Dowding and John 2007;James 2011;James and Moseley 2014;James and Van Ryzin 2017b). Furthermore, citizens who receive performance information from the government and public organizations may value the quality of managerial practices that include performance management, transparency and accountability mechanisms (Bouckaert 2012;Peiffer and Alvarez 2016).…”
This study explores the impact of the configuration of performance information on citizens' perceptions regarding the impact of the information on their lives and the reliability they assign to it. We conducted a survey experiment among a representative sample of the Israeli population. The treatment included the object being measured, the identity of those who manage the performance management mechanism, and the trend of the results. We also compared the education and police sectors. Our findings indicate that, overall, citizens feel that performance information has only a low‐to‐medium effect on their lives, and assign a similar level of reliability to that information. The configuration of performance information helps explain this perceived impact only to a limited extent. These findings question the usefulness of performance reporting mechanisms as a major tool for strengthening accountability and raise serious doubts about the possible ways to improve these mechanisms and make them more effective.
“…Based on this logic, we posit that: Hypothesis 1 : Citizens will regard performance management mechanisms as having a direct effect on their lives when they see organizational indicators rather than systemic indicators.A similar rationale applies when we consider the reliability citizens assign to performance information. The scholarly literature shows that people involved in performance management often distort measures and ‘game’ the system in ways that may produce misleading information (Heinrich and Marschke ; Lægreid and Neby ). Indeed, the stories that people may hear about or experience with regard to these strategies may lead them to view these indicators as unreliable.…”
Section: Citizens' Interpretations Of Performance Information: Impactmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A similar rationale applies when we consider the reliability citizens assign to performance information. The scholarly literature shows that people involved in performance management often distort measures and 'game' the system in ways that may produce misleading information (Heinrich and Marschke 2010;Laegreid and Neby 2016). Indeed, the stories that people may hear about or experience with regard to these strategies may lead them to view these indicators as unreliable.…”
Section: Citizens' Interpretations Of Performance Information: Impamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, the measures that the government publishes are supposed to inform the public about the performance of public organizations. Citizens can use this information to monitor public officials-both elected and appointed-thus strengthening public accountability (Thomas 2013;Barrows et al 2016;Laegreid and Neby 2016), make decisions that can ultimately improve their lives either through voice or exit, and make knowledgeable voting choices (Dowding and John 2007;James 2011;James and Moseley 2014;James and Van Ryzin 2017b). Furthermore, citizens who receive performance information from the government and public organizations may value the quality of managerial practices that include performance management, transparency and accountability mechanisms (Bouckaert 2012;Peiffer and Alvarez 2016).…”
This study explores the impact of the configuration of performance information on citizens' perceptions regarding the impact of the information on their lives and the reliability they assign to it. We conducted a survey experiment among a representative sample of the Israeli population. The treatment included the object being measured, the identity of those who manage the performance management mechanism, and the trend of the results. We also compared the education and police sectors. Our findings indicate that, overall, citizens feel that performance information has only a low‐to‐medium effect on their lives, and assign a similar level of reliability to that information. The configuration of performance information helps explain this perceived impact only to a limited extent. These findings question the usefulness of performance reporting mechanisms as a major tool for strengthening accountability and raise serious doubts about the possible ways to improve these mechanisms and make them more effective.
“…However, procedural accountability is just one of the many accountability demands characterizing the administration of Pompeii, and the public sector generally. Studies of accountability emphasize that public employees typically operate in an accountability web, facing multiple sources of legitimate authority, and competing expectations (Bovens, ; Bracci, ; Koppel, ; Leagreid & Neby, ; Luke, ; Romzek, ). In this sense, there is no certainty that decreasing accountability for procedures leads to a result‐oriented approach, or that this automatically implies the absence of any form of accountability.…”
Section: Positioning Patronage In the Accountability Debatementioning
Drawing on the concept of an accountability web, this paper analyzes the 2‐year long extraordinary administration of the archaeological site at Pompeii, where the Italian Prime Minister appointed a special Commissioner to deal with the alleged decay of the site in July 2008. Findings shed light on critical issues related to the appointment of “loyal experts” in terms of strong personalization, short‐term thinking, and the influence of the media in the administration of public services. Moreover, the paper introduces patronage accountability as a distinct accountability dimension that is characterized by a hierarchical and informal nature, and which cannot be accessed by those who are not part of the transaction. We add to the literature by identifying patronage accountability as a separate accountability dimension that conflicts with more common ones, and examine the implications of this practice for public administration.
“…Recent years have seen a sustained level of scholarly engagement with issues relating to accountability in a variety of settings, including government and the public sector (Mulgan 2003;Laegreid and Neby 2016), non-governmental organizations (Fassin 2009), the corporate sector (Reynolds and Yuthas 2008;Meng et al 2013), and religious organizations (Yasmin et al 2014). Examination of the nature and effectiveness of accountability arrangements in the regulatory context has been more limited , but is of potential significance given major regulatory shifts characterized by the delegation of standard-setting and enforcement functions to independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in a variety of socially significant regulatory domains (Mattli and Buhte 2005).…”
The growing reliance on non-governmental independent regulators in many social and economic domains, including corporate financial reporting, has brought to the fore concerns over their regulatory accountability. This study looks at one aspect of the regulatory due process-regulatory impact assessment (IA). Drawing on the analytical framework developed by Bovens (Public accountability: a framework for the analysis and assessment of accountability arrangements in the public domain. CONNEX papers, Research Group 2, Democracy and Accountability in the EU, 2006, Eur Law J 13(4): 447-468, 2007), we evaluate the contribution of IA as an instrument for enhancing regulatory accountability in the context of the Financial Reporting Council, an independent regulator for the accountancy profession in the UK. The study's findings suggest that, despite an increasing level of sophistication in the manner in which IA is used within FRC, the contribution of IA to regulatory accountability remains limited. Specifically, there are concerns as to whether IA is used to achieve a transparent and fair regulatory process or simply to maintain an image of good governance and justify policy decisions that would have been made even in the absence of IA.
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