Gangs and Crime Deterrence

Mansour, Abdala; Marceau, Nicolas; Mongrain, Steeve

doi:10.1093/jleo/ewj015

Cited by 39 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…The idea of applying leniency programs to criminal organizations builds upon the antitrust law enforcement literature, which studies the effects of reduced sanctions on cartel 4 See also Fiorentini and Peltzman (1995) and Mansour et al (2006).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law

2016

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When Legislators introduce laws that award amnesties to 'low-rank' criminals cooperating with the justice, top criminals may bribe public officials to subvert the law. Legislators should anticipate this reaction and fight it back by introducing policies that bundle amnesties for low-rank criminals with amnesties to corrupt officials who plea guilty. In fact, the threat of being betrayed by their fellows may induce top-criminals to rely on corruption (to avoid sanctions). However, a suitable amnesty for corrupt officials may increase the conviction risk not only for top-criminal but also for low-rank ones. This domino effect can deter crime more than a policy based only on amnesties to low-rank criminals would: a bright side of subversion of law.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law

2016

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“…As a result, (ii) implies that the denominator of C * and x * are both strictly positive and that the equilibrium profit π * (n) given by (15) and the equilibrium wage w * (n) given by (16) are both strictly positive.…”

Section: Proof Of Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Organized crime, corruption and punishment

Kügler

Verdier

Zénou

2005

Journal of Public Economics

104

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and corruption detection highly probable, we show that increasing policing or sanctions effectively deters crime.However, when bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents from criminal activity relative to legal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. In particular, the relationship between the traditional instruments of deterrence, namely intensification of policing and increment of sanctions, and crime is nonmonotonic. Beyond a threshold, increases in expected punishment induce organized crime to corruption, and ensuing impunity leads to higher rather than lower crime.JEL Classification: K42, L13.

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“…The goal of our analysis is to show that rituals provide a tool to enhance the coordination, cooperation, and productivity of criminal groups. Explaining criminal rituals therefore helps us to understand broader issues of governance within criminal organizations (Catino 2014;Dick 1995;Leeson 2007;Leeson and Rogers 2012;Leeson and Skarbek 2010;Levitt and Venkatesh 2001;Mansour, Marceau, and Mongrain 2006;Reuter 1983;Sanchez-Jankowski 1991, 63-100;Skarbek 2010Skarbek , 2011Skarbek , 2012. This research examines how, and how effectively, criminal groups operate.…”

Section: Rituals Governance and The Green Gangmentioning

confidence: 99%

Criminal rituals

Skarbek

Wang

2015

Global Crime

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Why do criminals use rituals? Past work argues that criminal rituals provide a sense of continuity or certainty in an inherently uncertain environment. We argue instead that rituals play an important organizational role. Criminal rituals facilitate internal governance and promote group activity through three mechanisms: creating common knowledge, mitigating the costs of asymmetric information, and shaping identity among group members. Using internal documents and written constitutions, we apply this framework to understand the internal governance mechanisms used by the late 19 th and 20 th century Chinese-based Green Gang.Global Crime 16(4) 2015: 288-305

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Gangs and Crime Deterrence

Cited by 39 publications

References 16 publications

Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law

Organized Crime and the Bright Side of Subversion of Law

Organized crime, corruption and punishment

Criminal rituals

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