Gangsters or Gandhians? The Political Sociology of the Maoist Insurgency in India

Abstract

IntroductionThe character of the Indian state has changed remarkably as a result of the economic reforms that were initiated in the early 1990s. This has been described as an "elite revolt" against the constraints of the dirigiste state by an alliance of business groups and the urban middle classes. 1 At the same time Maoist insurgents have expanded the areas in which they operate and increased the intensity of their operations, particularly in central and eastern states such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Orissa. 2 In recent years, representatives of the Indian state have made remarkable claims about the strength of the insurgents: former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described the insurgency as "the single biggest internal-security challenge ever faced by our country"; 3 according to P. Chidambaram, the erstwhile Union Minister of Home Affairs, the insurgents are "active" in 223 of India's 626 districts; 4 and his ministry claimed that the insurgents "call the shots" in 40,000 square kilometers of Indian territory-an area the size of Switzerland. 5 While such statements are very effective at grabbing the attention of interested observers, they leave many unanswered questions. Lay terms such as insurgent activity and calling the shots are used as if it is clear what they mean when, in fact, it is not. Such phrases are, as Durkheim puts it, "a tangle of vague impressions, prejudices, and emotions." 6 This article combines a variety of concepts from political sociology with evidence from newspaper reports, 7 insurgent and state documents, and ethnographic studies in order to analyze the nature of Maoist activities. There are two sections. The first aims to move beyond the prevailing Manichean understanding of the Maoist insurgency in India, which either portrays the insurgents as either gangsters or Gandhians. We show that both insurgent violence and fundraising serve, on the whole, the collective interests of the state building enterprise-that is, to consolidate insurgent control in their base areas-rather than the private interests of individual insurgents. The second section seeks to understand the interaction between the Maoist state builders and the Indian state. It argues that the insurgents undermine and fragment the state's monopoly of the means of violence and administration in areas where they operate: in some areas the Indian state is totally absent, while in others the state forms alliances with the insurgents in order to maintain the semblance of a sovereign and democratic ruler.

Wartime governance and state-building trajectories in post-conflict societies

“…One example is the influential 'people's courts' rolled out by Maoist groups in Nepal (Loyle 2020). Similar justice-dispensing activities also take place in areas under Naxalite influence in India, where armed groups provide justice and public goods to rural populations where the state has rarely exercised (or showed much interest in exercising) their functions (Kennedy 2014). The Taliban also operated an equally widespread system of courts and dispute adjudication (Giustozzi 2014).…”

“…The FARC in Colombia financed the construction of roads, provided medical services, and offered a range of justice and conflict adjudication processes (Arjona 2016;Ibáñez et al 2019). Justice and local conflict resolution provision was also at the heart of the expansion of Naxal rebels in India (Kennedy 2014). The LTTE in Sri Lanka provided education and health care, at times in collaboration with the Government of Sri Lanka (Flanigan 2008;Mampilly 2009Mampilly , 2011Stokke 2006).…”

The Tactical Use of Civil Resistance by Rebel Groups: Evidence from India’s Maoist Insurgency

“…The conflict represents a typical case with regard to the outlined scope conditions: First, the CPI-Maoist has underscored its ambition to seek and maintain local authority through the development of governance structures, including "People's Governments" and the provision of services (Kennedy 2014;Suykens 2015). Second, the military capabilities of the belligerents are highly asymmetrical, a condition favoring the diversification of rebel tactics.…”

The Political Construction of Extractive Regimes in Two Newly Created Indian States: A Comparative Analysis of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh

“…Violent resistance to extraction in the form of left‐wing extremism has occurred in both states; in Jharkhand it is more widely dispersed whereas in Chhattisgarh it is mainly concentrated in the southern districts. Left‐wing extremists or ‘Naxals’ have waged a long struggle against state‐sponsored and corporate‐backed mining and industrialization, especially in the wake of economic liberalization in the early 1990s and state creation in 2000 (Kennedy, 2014; Sundar, 2016). Jharkhand's crackdown on Maoists is a weak parallel to Chhattisgarh which took a notoriously hard line by promoting a vigilante army called Salwa Judum (‘purification hunt’) in 2005 (Sundar, 2016).…”