2014
DOI: 10.1103/physreva.89.042335
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Gaussian-modulated coherent-state measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution

Abstract: Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), leaving the detection procedure to the third partner and thus being immune to all detector side-channel attacks, is very promising for the construction of high-security quantum information networks. We propose a scheme to implement MDI-QKD, but with continuous variables instead of discrete ones, i.e., with the source of Gaussian-modulated coherent states, based on the principle of continuous-variable entanglement swapping. This protocol not onl… Show more

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Cited by 96 publications
(51 citation statements)
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“…The observed phase-noise variance is 0.04 (rad 2 ), which is small enough to enable secure key distribution. This technology also opens the door for other novel quantum communication protocols, such as the measurement-device-independent (MDI) CV-QKD protocol [25][26][27], where independent light sources are employed by different users. This paper is organized as follows: In Sec.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The observed phase-noise variance is 0.04 (rad 2 ), which is small enough to enable secure key distribution. This technology also opens the door for other novel quantum communication protocols, such as the measurement-device-independent (MDI) CV-QKD protocol [25][26][27], where independent light sources are employed by different users. This paper is organized as follows: In Sec.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are cases when the two trusted QKD parties prepared quantum states while the measurement was conducted by a dishonest player, a scenario as in measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [46]. In these cases, the security proof and key rate formulas developed in CV MDI-QKD [47][48][49] could be applied directly. We remark that the existing schemes of CV MDI-QKD require a highly efficient homodyne detector and are more sensitive to channel losses.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Finally, since HD blinding attack is a detector-based attack, MDI CV-QKD [55][56][57] can be a potential solution to defeat such attack. Although a proof-of-principle demonstration of MDI CV-QKD has been already performed in experiment [57], there is still a large gap between practical implementation and theoretical proposal.…”
Section: Countermeasuresmentioning
confidence: 99%