Gazprom and the complexity of the EU gas market: a strategy to define

Abstract

International audienceConfronted with an increasingly competitive market in the European Union and the credible threat of a new entrant in the form of liquefied natural gas imports from the United States, Gazprom’s traditional export strategy is open to question. The company must decide whether it should launch a price war in order passively to adapt to impending competition and its role as a ‘residual supplier’ to the EU gas market, or whether it should take advantage of the current price uncertainty. This article explores the scope for long-term strategic action by Gazprom other than simply engaging in a price war. It is argued that Gazprom could forge a position as a key player in the EU gas market capable of playing the same role as Saudi Arabia does in the global oil market

The rise of transnational state capital: state-led foreign investment in the 21st century

“…The control-strategy that Russia embraces differs from those discussed above to the extent that Russian foreign state ownership is focused on developing and growing its mostly European subsidiaries of its large state-owned oil companies, mainly Gazprom (see also Panibratov, 2017). This strategy is based on the unique position of Russia as the number one gas and crude oil provider for Europe (Boussena & Locatelli, 2017). Besides adapting to a liberalizing energy market in Europe, the internationalization of Gazprom and others has also distinctive geopolitical characteristics (Stulberg, 2015), which is exemplified in the heated debates about the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project (Goldthau, 2016).…”

Les relations gazières entre l’Union européenne et la Russie : de la coopération à la confrontation

“…L'importance du marché européen pour la compagnie et la Russie permet à l'UE de contraindre les stratégies de la compagnie. Face aux évolutions structurelles de la fin des années 2000 (surplus d'offre, faible demande, volatilité des prix), celle-ci modifie sa politique contractuelle en matière de prix pour rester compétitive dans un environnement très concurrentiel (Boussena et Locatelli, 2017). La menace de voir les exportations américaines de GNL réduire sa part de marché en Europe oblige Gazprom à des adaptations significatives.…”

“…L'importance de ses réserves, de sa production, la proximité de ses marchés et son bas coût de production lui confèrent des avantages comparatifs par rapport à ses concurrents. Ainsi afin de contenir la concurrence, il lui suffit de maintenir dans ses contrats des prix légèrement inférieurs à ceux de ses principaux concurrents, stratégie que la compagnie a expérimentée avec succès durant la fin des années 2010 (Boussena et Locatelli, 2017 ;Abbas et Locatelli, 2020). Ceci lui a permis de maximiser les volumes exportés tout en limitant la pénétration des exportations américaines de GNL en Europe.…”

The Twenty Years’ Crisis of European Energy Security: Central and Eastern Europe and the US

“…Although the EU has been keen to maintain its normative role as a law-governed supranational liberal actor, there has certainly been an element of 'realism' in how it has promoted a project such as the Nabucco pipeline while actively undermining Russia's alternative South Stream pipeline (Baev and Øverland 2010). The EC's intense regulatory focus on Gazprom has been another element of this 'realist' approach with the EU competition authorities initiating an investigation into Gazprom's supply and pricing of gas in CEE in 2011 (Boussena and Locatelli 2017). This investigation examined whether Gazprom hindered the free flow of gas, prevented diversification of supply, and imposed unfair prices by linking the price of gas to oil prices (Goldthau and Sitter 2014).…”