Gender and the Foundations of Social Choice: The Role of Situated Agency

Peter, Fabienne

doi:10.1080/1354570022000078006

Cited by 79 publications

(57 citation statements)

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“…Public reasoning pertains to how agents take part in collective discussion of public concerns, and requires that the political rules are justifiable or acceptable to all. The importance of public reasoning has already been noted by other authors (Qizilbach 2007, Gilardone 2013, as has the fact that Sen's idea of justice is path-breaking (Peter 2012). To our knowledge, however, our paper is the first to suggest that this novel feature of Sen's contribution cannot be properly understood in the absence of a primary step that consists in demonstrating that the capability-centered view is misconceived.…”

contrasting

confidence: 41%

“…The apparent disagreement between Amartya Sen and his commentators on the status of capability in his thought is puzzling. This paper challenges the dominant reading, here called the "capability-centered view", according to which capabilities are at the core of Sen's contribution to issues of justice (e.g., Gasper 2002, Pressman and Summerfield 2002, Bénicourt 2007, Bonvin and Farvaque 2008, Robeyns and Brighouse 2010, Davis 2012. In the first step, we disentangle the main features of this disagreement, in order to be able, in the second step, to clarify the basis for an alternative theory of justice consistent with our reading.…”

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confidence: 97%

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Sen is not a capability theorist

Baujard

Gilardone

2016

Journal of Economic Methodology

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Abstract:This paper aims to show that, contrary to the standard understanding of his work, Sen's idea of justice does not consist in the defense of a capability theory. Under the dominant capability-centered view, Sen's idea of justice is indeed characterized principally by a switch of focus from utility to capability. We demonstrate that this view amounts to the application of formal welfarism to capabilities. We reject this characterization and defend instead a heuristic account of the status of capability in Sen's thought: capability was introduced to make a point against welfarism, but this does not imply that a commitment to a capability theory. The capability-centered view is shown to be inconsistent with Sen's idea of justice, because the latter requires agents to be involved in the definition of their own welfare. Our study of the status of capability in Sen's view of justice enables us to relocate his main contribution and to build the basis for an alternative theory of justice. Keywords:Capability, welfarism, justice, operationalization, paternalism, agency, public reasoning JEL codes:Sen is not a capability theorist Abstract. This paper aims to show that, contrary to the standard understanding of his work, Sen's idea of justice does not consist in the defense of a capability theory. Under the dominant capabilitycentered view, Sen's idea of justice is indeed characterized principally by a switch of focus from utility to capability. We demonstrate that this view amounts to the application of formal welfarism to capabilities. We reject this characterization and defend instead a heuristic account of the status of capability in Sen's thought: capability was introduced to make a point against welfarism, but this does not imply that a commitment to a capability theory. The capability-centered view is shown to be inconsistent with Sen's idea of justice, because the latter requires agents to be involved in the definition of their own welfare. Our study of the status of capability in Sen's view of justice enables us to relocate his main contribution and to build the basis for an alternative theory of justice.

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contrasting

confidence: 41%

mentioning

confidence: 97%

Sen is not a capability theorist

Baujard

Gilardone

2016

Journal of Economic Methodology

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“…Indeed, scholars frequently refer to the 'received view' of rational choice theory, the development and specification of which has become closely linked to economic scholarship (Gauthier 1974;Lagueux 2004;Peter 2003). Critics appraise rational choice theory as if it were a monolithic framework, as if that what has been labeled 'rational choice theory' was an established and recognized theoretical construct (e.g.…”

Section: Disunity About Rational Choice Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Axiomatic Choice Theory Traveling between Mathematical Formalism, Normative Choice Rules and Psychological Measurement, 1944-1956

Herfeld

2013

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. [1944][1945][1946][1947][1948][1949][1950][1951][1952][1953][1954][1955][1956] by Catherine Herfeld Choice Rules and Psychological Measurement, 1944-1956 June 2013 Catherine Herfeld Draft 1.0 (Please do not cite without the author's permission) Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThe following analysis is meant to contribute to a history of rational choice theory. More specifically, I provide a multi-layered account of rational choice theory in terms of its biography as a scientific object. I argue that its axiomatic version, choice theory traveled between different research sites, specified within the context of different mathematical formalisms and occupying different epistemic functions; it was being applied to prescribe rules of proper behavior, as representation of behavioral hypotheses, and as measurement device to capture individual values. New modifications of what I call 'axiomatic choice theory' did not fully replace old versions of it, which prevents the reconstruction of its 'travels' as a continuous process and acknowledges the different versions of axiomatic choice theory that are currently used in the social sciences, particularly in economics. Furthermore, by revealing the diversity of its manifestations within the context of social networks and within particular research sites, the account of axiomatic choice theory developed here will ultimately contributes to an explanation of the disunity and confusion surrounding current debates about rational choice theory and allows for providing a more nuanced picture of its nature and scope. Jacob Marschak's professional development is used as a guide through this history of axiomatic choice theory to illustrate its journey. JEL classification: B2, B3, B 21Keywords: axiomatic method, Jacob Marschak, rational choice theory, Cowles Commission, expected utility theory, biographies of scientific objects, behavioral sciences, Ford Foundation, John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, game theory. 3 Disunity about Rational Choice TheoryIn this paper, I provide the first sketch of a narrative that traces axiomatic choice theory developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern and how it traveled through the Cowles Commission in the 1940s and 1950s. The paper is part of a larger project that aims to contribute to the formulation of a history of rational choice theory. Ever since the inception of the discipline of economics, the traditional rationality-principle has been of interest for methodologist.1 ...

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“…In the rest of the article, I will first introduce the key concepts of the CA, its applications and critiques, then present a preliminary discussion on what we can learn from the CA to study ICT for development. The discussion will focus on four themes from the capability approach: means and ends of development; human diversity; agency and "restricted agency" (Peter, 2003); and a different "evaluative space" (Sen, 1993) for inequality. Some provisional research questions are also derived for the consideration of fellow researchers.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Different spaces for e-development: What can we learn from the capability approach?

Zheng

2009

Information Technology for Development

143

134

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"e-Development" is often pursued with a lot of thinking on the 'e' and little on the 'development,' rendering the link between them ambiguous and fragile. It is important to explicate what kind of "development" is being pursued, and how information and communication technology (ICT) can contribute to this goal. This article draws on Amartya Sen's capability approach to provide some theoretical reflections on e-development. It is argued that the capability approach, being a normative and evaluative approach, provides us with a different "space" to assess e-development and allows us to sensitize and take into account a variety of important issues surrounding ICT adoption for development. This article first provides an introduction to key concepts of the capability approach, which are then drawn on to generate implications for e-development research. C 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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Gender and the Foundations of Social Choice: The Role of Situated Agency

Cited by 79 publications

References 1 publication

Sen is not a capability theorist

Sen is not a capability theorist

Axiomatic Choice Theory Traveling between Mathematical Formalism, Normative Choice Rules and Psychological Measurement, 1944-1956

Different spaces for e-development: What can we learn from the capability approach?

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