Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores

Abstract

Gender-based taxation (GBT ) satisfies Ramsey's rule because it taxes at a lower rate the more elastic labor supply of women. We study GBT in a model in which labor elasticities emerge endogenously from intrahousehold bargaining. We explore the cases of superior bargaining power for men, higher male wages, and higher female home productivity. In all cases, men commit to a career in the market, take less home duties than women, and have lower labor supply elasticity. When society resolves its distributional concerns efficiently with gender-specific lump sum transfers, GBT with higher marginal tax rates on (single and married) men is optimal. (JEL D13, H21, H24, J16, J22)

Unveiling the Cosmic Race: Racial Inequalities in Latin America

“…There is valuable room for public policies. On a purely theoretical perspective, the results suggest that, since skin tone is fixed and there is little room for behavioral responses, taxing alternatives as 'tagging' (Akerlof 1978;Alesina, Ichino, and Karabarbounis 2011;Piketty and Saez 2013) could play an essential role in overcoming racial disparities at early year stages. However, consistent with recent literature (Derenoncourt and Montialoux 2020), the results suggest that progressive income and wealth taxation is also progressive in racial disparities.…”

Australia’s Tax Law Policy of the Past and that of the Post Digital Revolution

“…142 In a follow-up paper, the authors find that gender-based taxation (GBT) may help mitigate the gender gap by improving the status of women in the work force and within the family unit. 143 GBT satisfies Ramsey's rule because it taxes at a lower rate the more elastic labour supply of women. The authors study GBT in a model in which labour elasticities emerge endogenously from intrahousehold bargaining.…”

Tributación como campo amplio y recurrente de investigación

“…Uno de los intereses centrales de la investigación acerca del impuesto óptimo es la inclusión de transferencias para las parejas y la toma de decisiones familiares para la determinación de reglas impositivas que conduzcan al óptimo a través de microsimulaciones. Existen trabajos que, por ejemplo, plantean que la tributación basada en el género llega al nivel óptimo cuando carga con mayores impuestos a los hombres que a las mujeres, dadas sus características específicas (Immervoll, Kleven, Kreiner, & Verdelin, 2011;Alesina, Ichino, & Karabarbounis, 2011). Trabajos similares analizan el nivel óptimo de impuestos en relación con la convivencia en parejas, enfocándose en los efectos de los divorcios en los niveles de tributación (Bargain & Keane, 2010) y en la tributación óptima cuando se dividen los ingresos de las parejas (Bach, Corneo, & Steiner, 2012).…”