Gender Diversity in the Boardroom: The Multiple Versions of Quota Laws in Europe

Gabaldón, Patricia; Mensi-Klarbach, Heike; Seierstad, Cathrine

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-56142-4_10

Cited by 13 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In these cases, quotas typically apply to the supervisory board of external non-executive directors (Kirsch 2017). In other countries, especially the Anglo-Saxon countries as well as France, one-tier corporate boards are predominant that combine the supervisory and the executive body in one board of directors (Gabaldon et al 2017). The Eurobarometer question was adapted in each country by considering the national specificities of the set-up of company boards and by adjusting the question formulation accordingly.…”

Section: Sample Description and Individual-level Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equality prescribed? Contextual determinants of citizens’ support for gender boardroom quotas across Europe

Möhring

Teney

2019

Comp Eur Polit

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We provide the first cross-national comparative study of citizens' support for affirmative action policies in the economy using the example of gender quotas for company boards. In contrast to previous studies, we focus on the contextual level and analyse how factors related to political institutions and actors, and economic and social structure shape citizens' support and the gap in support between men and women. We apply multilevel regression analyses of Eurobarometer data for 27 European countries. Levels of support and gender gaps in support for boardroom quotas vary largely between countries. Contextual factors related to existing quota laws, gender equality in social and economic life, and public opinion towards state intervention are important determinants of cross-national variation. Our results point to an ambiguous relationship of support for gender quotas and actual gender equality in a country. Citizens' endorsement of quotas is low in countries with high levels of formal gender equality. Support is higher in countries where interventionist policies are widely accepted. Also, existing quota laws are positively related to citizens' support of boardroom quotas.

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Section: Sample Description and Individual-level Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equality prescribed? Contextual determinants of citizens’ support for gender boardroom quotas across Europe

Möhring

Teney

2019

Comp Eur Polit

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“…European countries differ on when and whether they mandated quotas for women's representation on the boards of private (ranging from Norway being the first in 2003 to Switzerland being the latest in 2018) and state-owned (ranging from Denmark being the first in 2000 to Poland and Greece being the latest in 2012) organisations (Corporate Women Directors International, 2018). In addition to the timing of quota adoption, there is significant inter-country variation in the nature of mandated quotas, including the targeted level of female representation on boards, the type of organisations subject to the mandate and the consequences of failing to comply with the mandated quota (Gabaldon et al, 2017;Szydło, 2015). Yet Gabaldon et al (2017) identify commonalities across countries in the processes leading to the adoption of quotas, that is: (1) groups of women (whether workers, civil servants, or politicians) mobilised for the purpose of increasing board diversity, (2) the quest for board diversity was consistent with national commitments to gender equality, and (3) sympathetic politicians recognised increased legitimacy and political gains in supporting legislation mandating women's representation on boards.…”

Section: Does Country Context Matter?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to the timing of quota adoption, there is significant inter-country variation in the nature of mandated quotas, including the targeted level of female representation on boards, the type of organisations subject to the mandate and the consequences of failing to comply with the mandated quota (Gabaldon et al, 2017;Szydło, 2015). Yet Gabaldon et al (2017) identify commonalities across countries in the processes leading to the adoption of quotas, that is: (1) groups of women (whether workers, civil servants, or politicians) mobilised for the purpose of increasing board diversity, (2) the quest for board diversity was consistent with national commitments to gender equality, and (3) sympathetic politicians recognised increased legitimacy and political gains in supporting legislation mandating women's representation on boards. As has long been noted, these political efforts to mediate the labour market are often associated with higher incomes for subordinate groups and reduced inequality (Korpi, 1983).…”

Section: Does Country Context Matter?mentioning

confidence: 99%

National Board Quotas and the Gender Pay Gap among European Managers

Maume

Heymann

Ruppanner

2019

Work, Employment and Society

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As European countries have mandated quotas for women’s representation on boards, and as women have increasingly entered the ranks of management, a persistent gender gap in managerial pay remains. Drawing a sample of managers in the 2010 European Social Survey, the gender gap in pay was decomposed, finding that employer devaluation of women accounted for the majority of the gender gap in pay. This was especially true in countries without mandated quotas, but in countries that had adopted quotas for female representation on boards, results were consistent with the proposition that quotas moderated the labour market for managers (i.e. the gender gap in managerial pay was smaller as was the portion of the gap attributable to discrimination). As board quotas have increasingly been adopted across Europe, more research is needed on their ameliorative effects on gender inequality in the wider labour market.

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“…Equality requires a balance between women and men of at least 40:60 (Du Plessis et al 2014; see also European Commission 2012). Yet targets for female representation specified in national code recommendations usually range between 30 and 35% (Gabaldon et al 2017a). Here we can identify a potential downside of the binary hit-or-miss logic of targets: As companies strive to meet but not exceed them, they function not merely as drivers for gender diversity but also as caps, which actually impede gender equality.…”

Section: Policy Implications: Introduce Specific Targets Threaten Tomentioning

confidence: 99%

The Carrot or the Stick: Self-Regulation for Gender-Diverse Boards via Codes of Good Governance

2019

Self Cite

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Scholars have emphasized the potential of self-regulation, realized through 'codes of good governance', to improve gender diversity on boards. Yet, unconvinced of the effectiveness of this self-regulation, many regulators have implemented mandatory quota laws. Our study sheds light on this dilemma. Seeking to broaden our conceptual knowledge of how such 'codes' work in the specific case of gender diversity on boards, we ask: Under which conditions is self-regulation via voluntary principles of good governance effective? Expanding recent institutional-theory perspectives from the literature of women on boards, we show that, in the case of Austria, self-regulation via code recommendations is ineffective unless supported by additional forces. The primary reason for this, we argue, is that nominators do not expect benefits from gender-diverse boards. Furthermore, non-compliant companies face little pressure to change due to the small number of companies that have already adopted respective code recommendations. We identify two potential alternatives to boost the effectiveness of voluntary self-regulation for gender-diverse boards: First, the introduction of concrete targets for female representation and the public monitoring of fulfillment; and, second, the establishment of a credible threat that mandatory quotas will be imposed if diversity goals are not achieved. Drawing on longitudinal data from 2006 to 2016 on listed and state-owned companies in Austria, we give an empirical account of the conditions that assure effective self-regulation. Arguing that codes suffer from what we call 'opportunity bias', we conclude that political goals (such as gender equality) based on ethical rather than instrumental considerations are unlikely to be effectively implemented solely by codes of good governance.

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Gender Diversity in the Boardroom: The Multiple Versions of Quota Laws in Europe

Cited by 13 publications

References 8 publications

Equality prescribed? Contextual determinants of citizens’ support for gender boardroom quotas across Europe

Equality prescribed? Contextual determinants of citizens’ support for gender boardroom quotas across Europe

National Board Quotas and the Gender Pay Gap among European Managers

The Carrot or the Stick: Self-Regulation for Gender-Diverse Boards via Codes of Good Governance

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