Gender selection discrimination: Evidence from a Trust game

Social distance in a virtual world experiment

“…Attitudes also matter. Slonim (2006) finds that the preference of male first movers for female second movers in the trust game is primarily driven by taste, rather than expectation. Such preferences, even when well intentioned, may reduce social welfare (Becker, 1957).…”

“…Trust is not significantly affected by the choice of icon, but this is likely due to the restricted choice space (two branches) given to the first movers. Slonim (2006) and Slonim and Garbarino (2006) examine how selection affects choice in a trust game with a multiplier of 3, with and without partner selection. Available responders are identified by gender and one other attribute (score on an addition task in Slonim, 2006;age in Slonim and Garbarino, 2006).…”

“…Slonim (2006) and Slonim and Garbarino (2006) examine how selection affects choice in a trust game with a multiplier of 3, with and without partner selection. Available responders are identified by gender and one other attribute (score on an addition task in Slonim, 2006;age in Slonim and Garbarino, 2006). In the selection treatment, first movers are able to choose between partners (three in Slonim, 2006;two in Slonim and Garbarino, 2006), whereas in the no selection treatment, first movers are not given a choice between possible partners.…”

“…Available responders are identified by gender and one other attribute (score on an addition task in Slonim, 2006;age in Slonim and Garbarino, 2006). In the selection treatment, first movers are able to choose between partners (three in Slonim, 2006;two in Slonim and Garbarino, 2006), whereas in the no selection treatment, first movers are not given a choice between possible partners. The study finds that selection increases the amount sent and thus efficiency and that first movers' selection is not independent of the amount sent.…”

Financial competence, overconfidence, and trusting investments: Results from an experiment

“…One strand of literature considers modifications and extensions of the institutional environment to assess changes in behavior. For example, allowing for the history of one's partners' actions to be known (Bohnet and Huck 2004), repeated play (Sloof and Sonnemans 2011), uncertainty over the actual choice of the first-mover (Cox and Deck 2006), requests and threats (Houser et al 2008), partner selection (Slonim and Garbarino 2008;Slonim and Guillen 2010), pairings made by previous trusting behavior (Rigdon et al 2007), heterogeneous endowments (Anderson et al 2006), and trust across individuals of different ages (Sutter and Kocher 2007). An alternative research line is to use the Trust Game as a measurement of behaviors and then identify correlates with these investments.…”